out for 15 miles northwest on muddy
roads broken by swollen streams. Physi-
cally and mentally fatigued himself, the
redoubtable Jackson had only 48 hours to
get his entire force to its assigned position
near Richmond, 30 miles away, in time to
meet Lee’s timetable. According to Lee’s
General Orders No. 75, Jackson was to
spend the next night at “some convenient
point west of the Virginia Central Rail-
road,” then move at 3 AMon June 26
toward his objective, Pole Green Church
near Hundley’s Corner northeast of Rich-
mond. When he passed the railroad on the
morning of the 26th, Jackson was sup-
posed to communicate his location to
Branch and continue advancing. Nowhere
in Lee’s somewhat ambiguous orders was
there a specific mention of, or location for,
an anticipated battle.
In scorching heat and adverse condi-
tions, the June 25 march proved extremely
arduous. Jackson and his men arrived west
of Ashland at sundown, still six miles short
of their objective, Slash Church. That
night, Stuart and his 2,000 cavalrymen
arrived with a three-gun battery to deploy
on Jackson’s left for the next day’s march.
To compensate for the six-mile shortfall,Jackson assured Lee that he would have
his troops on the road by 2:30 AM.
By dawn on June 26, Jackson had man-
aged only eight hours of sleep in the pre-
vious four days, had fallen feverishly ill,
and bore little resemblance to the energetic
tactician of the recently concluded Valley
campaign. Brig. Gen. William Whiting’s
lead division, with Brig. Gen. John Bell
Hood’s Texas Brigade in the vanguard,
moved out on time, but it was well after 8
AMby the time Jackson’s main force—
seven infantry brigades and nine artillery
batteries—got underway. Food and
ammunition wagons bogged down and
couldn’t keep pace, and the scarcity of
fresh water in the Ashland area forced sol-
diers to scour the countryside in search of
springs or wells. Once the Confederate col-
umn was finally on the road, Jackson
pushed his men forward as best he could,
but one delay after another impeded his
progress.
Four abreast, the troops pushed for-
ward over poor, muddy, unfamiliar roads.
Their maps were woefully inadequate, and
reports of enemy sightings brought the col-
umn to frequent halts. The column wound
down Ashcake Road past Slash Churchand reached the Virginia Central Railroad
around 9 AM, six hours behind schedule.
Jackson dutifully informed Branch of his
position by mounted courier, had a quick
meal with his men, and resumed the
march. The inexperienced Branch, in a
costly blunder, failed to convey Jackson’s
message to A.P. Hill, as ordered. Instead,
upon receipt of the message, Branch and
his North Carolinians, marching down-
river on Jackson’s right, encountered a siz-
able force of Union cavalry and pickets. A
vigorous skirmish ensued. The delay
meant that Branch would arrive too late
to take part in any action near Mechan-
icsville that day. Jackson’s and Ewell’s
columns continued slogging ahead on par-
allel roads.
By 10 AM, Jackson and Ewell had
cleared the railroad. In the lead, Ewell
turned to the right three-quarters of a mile
past the tracks, pushing southward toward
Shady Grove Church. Jackson continued
for another mile and then turned right in
the direction of Pole Green Church.
Destroyed bridges, makeshift barricades,
and enemy sniper fire continued to slow
Jackson’s progress. Jackson sent Branch a
second note at 10 AM, informing him theCWQ-Sum16 Mechanicsville_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:15 PM Page 49