Of the suicidal advance, Confederate
Colonel Porter Alexander wrote, “A more
hopeless charge was never entered upon.
When Ripley came up, he sent his 2nd
Arkansas Battalion ahead as skirmishers
in Pender’s front, directly into the face of
enemy defenders entrenched above Eller-
son’s Mill. Two of his regiments, the 44th
Georgia and 1st North Carolina, attacked
on Pender’s right, while the 48th Georgia
and 3rd North Carolina advanced on the
left. McCall later wrote of the failed Con-
federate assault, “After a time, a heavy col-
umn was launched down the road to Eller-
son’s Mill, where a determined attack was
made. I had already sent Easton’s battery
to Gen. Seymour, and I now moved the
Seventh Regiment down to the extreme
left, apprehending that the enemy might
attempt to turn that flank by crossing the
stream below the mill. Here, however, the
Reserves maintained their position and
sustained their character for steadiness in
splendid style, never losing a foot of
ground during a severe struggle with some
of the best troops of the enemy, fighting
under the direction of their most distin-
guished general. For hour after hour the
battle was hotly contested, and the rapid
fire of our artillery, dealing death to an
awful extent, was unintermitted.”
Limping back from the creek under
ruinous fire, the walking wounded
brought news of the attack’s failure. The
always caustic D.H. Hill said later, “The
result was, as might have been foreseen, a
bloody and disastrous repulse.” The 44th
Georgia made it to the creek’s western
bank and fought bravely for almost two
hours, finally running out of ammunition
and losing 361 men killed or wounded of
the regiment’s 514 members. The 1st
North Carolina lost 133, including its
colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, six cap-
tains, and 10 lieutenants. Of the 14,000
Union soldiers engaged at Beaver Dam
Creek, only 361 became casualties; the
Confederates suffered 1,484 casualties.
Ripley’s brigade suffered the worst, losing
a staggering 575 men killed, wounded, or
missing, about 60 percent of its strength.
Around sunset, Griffin’s brigade arrivedon the field and took up a supporting posi-
tion to Reynolds’s rear. Porter wisely
extended his right flank, dispatching Brig.
Gen. John Martindale’s brigade to a point
behind Reynolds’s position, where he
could guard against any enemy approach
over the road from Hanover Court House.
There, Martindale skirmished briefly with
some of Jackson’s advanced pickets.
Nightfall brought an end to the infantry
fighting, although artillery and sniper fire
continued for several hours.
In their first major encounter, Lee and
the Army of Northern Virginia had suf-
fered a severe repulse, Lee managing to get
less than a fourth of his available troops
into action and then only in costly, piece-
meal frontal assaults against entrenched
enemy positions. Mechanicsville was the
worst fiasco committed by either side since
Ball’s Bluff back in October 1861, this time
with the lopsided casualty figures reversed.
McClellan wired Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton that evening: “Victory today com-
plete and against great odds. I almost begin
to think we are invincible.”
As night fell on June 26, the capture of
Richmond was unquestionably within
McClellan’s reach. Porter’s reinforced V
Corps, now more than 30,000 strong, held
near-impregnable positions north of the
Chickahominy, backed by concentrated
artillery batteries. McClellan commanded
67,000 fresh troops south of the river
opposite 23,000 Confederates, many of
them green reinforcements, while Lee’s
bloodied forces north of the river were
scattered and disjointed. There had been
no word from Jackson since morning and
no one knew his whereabouts. McClellan
had two golden opportunities: he could
exploit the victory by heavily reinforcing
Porter north of the river, go on the offen-
sive there, and destroy the enemy’s army.
Or, as several of his subordinates implored
him to do, McClellan could instruct Porter
to hold the river crossings while he him-
self attacked south of the river, with almost
a 3-to-1 numerical superiority, and cap-
tured the enemy’s capital.
Instead, McClellan did neither. After
another day of combat, the bloodbath atGaines’ Mill—Lee’s only tactical victory of
the Seven Days, won at horrendous cost—
McClellan abandoned all thought of mak-
ing a stand or going on the offensive.
Incredibly, the Young Napoleon wired
Washington on June 28 that he was under
attack by superior numbers on both sides
of the Chickahominy. “I have lost this bat-
tle because my force was too small,” he
wired Stanton. “The government must not
and cannot hold me responsible for the
result. If I save this army now, I tell you
plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any
other persons in Washington. You have
done your best to sacrifice this army.” An
astounded colonel in the telegraph office
deleted the final two sentences before
transmitting the dispatch to Stanton.
McClellan ordered Porter to protect the
river crossings while he prepared for a
“change of base,” a euphemism for retreat,
to the James River. The Army of the
Potomac conducted a skillful fighting
retreat that severely punished the attack-
ers, especially at Malvern Hill on July 1,
but despite continued pleas by his subor-
dinates to use that victory as a springboard
for a counteroffensive, McClellan contin-
ued the retreat. By abandoning the York
and Richmond Railroad, he effectively lost
the ability to mount and maintain a siege
of Richmond and surrendered the initia-
tive to Lee. By July 2, the bloodied but still
combat effective Army of the Potomac was
more than 20 miles from Richmond, at
Harrison’s Landing on the James River.
Within weeks, McClellan would evacuate
the Peninsula.
The Seven Days replaced Southern
despair with renewed hope. “The almost
funereal pall which has hung around our
country since the fall of Fort Donelson,
seems at last to be passing away,”
declared the Richmond Examineron July- “From out of gloom and disaster of the
past, the martial spirit has emerged, and
the superior skill and valor of our men
over our brutal foe is incontestably estab-
lished.” Somehow, McClellan had man-
aged to turn victory into defeat. It would
not be the last time he accomplished that
questionable feat.
CWQ-Sum16 Mechanicsville_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:16 PM Page 53