gestions put forward, the most promising
seemed to originate from Lt. Gen. James
Longstreet. Longstreet’s command, an
infantry corps of about 14,000 men, had
been loaned to Bragg’s army in September
in order to resist Rosecrans’ advance on
Chattanooga. Consisting of about a third
of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Vir-
ginia, it had been accustomed to victory
and was responsible for delivering the deci-
sive blow at Chickamauga. Having partic-
ipated in Lee’s daring flank marches
against the Federal armies in the East dur-
ing 1862 and 1863, it was natural for
“Old Pete” to recommend such a move to
pry the Bluecoats out of their fortified posi-
tion at Chattanooga.
Longstreet’s plan was that the army
cross to the north bank of the Tennessee
River above the Union-held city and cut
Rosecrans’ communications and supply
lines leading back to Nashville. Being thus
isolated from reinforcements and provi-sions, Longstreet reasoned the enemy
would have to abandon Chattanooga or
starve in place. The South Carolinian,
reflecting the aggressive strategic vision of
his superior, Lee, argued that once the Fed-
erals were on the move Bragg could strike
once more, destroying them and thus
reclaiming middle Tennessee for the South.
That done, the Army could then march
upon Burnside’s Yankee force at Knoxville
and free the “Volunteer State” from the
Northern aggressor.
At first receptive to Longstreet’s bold
plan, Bragg then rejected it. First, it was too
daring for Bragg’s liking; second, his army
did not have the transport and supplies
needed to head north away from its base of
operations; and third, he was suspicious of
Longstreet’s motives, fearing that it was all
a scheme to replace Bragg with the plan’s
designer as the head of the Army of Ten-
nessee. As a result, Bragg took a middle
course in order to eliminate Rosecrans andhis men. He would keep his foot soldiers
near Chattanooga to continue that town’s
investment while sending a large cavalry
force to sweep into the enemy’s rear area
and destroy his remaining supply line. Sev-
ered from foodstuffs and reinforcements,
the Army of the Cumberland would wither
on the vine from lack of subsistence and the
means to defend itself. Although a half-mea-
sure, the critical situation the Northern
army was in held some hope that Bragg’s
idea would work. Further, it came to the
Southern general’s attention that by late
September Union reinforcements from
Grant’s army in Mississippi and Meade’s
Army of the Potomac were being sent to
save Rosecrans. Thus time was running out
for the South to retake Chattanooga. Bragg
knew he must set in motion an operation
that would so panic his weakened foe that
it would cause them to abandon the prize
they stubbornly held—the strategically vital
Chattanooga area.The Southern cavalrymen who
fought in the American Civil War
between the Appalachian Moun-
tains and the Mississippi River
were in many respects like their
counterparts in the East and in
other ways very different.
Cavalry was employed in tasks
suited to its unique ability for
rapid movement. Conducting
scouts to find and gather intelli-
gence about the enemy, screening
the army when in camp and on the
march, acting as the advance in
forward movements and the rear
guard during retreats, and raiding
enemy lines of communications
were the daily fare of all cavalry
during the conflict. Regulations for
camp and field tactics, as well as
unit organization (i.e., companies,
squadrons, and regiments) were
almost the same in both theaters
of war, and for that matter appliedto Northern and Southern troop-
ers since the two sides used
updated versions of “Old Army”
prewar manuals.
Like their brothers-in-arms in
the East, Western troopers used
similar equipment. Grimsely and
McClellan saddles were widely
employed, and felt hats with large
brims to keep the rain out of the
face, as well as to carry food for
man and beast, were favored. Wool
uniforms with double-seated pants
and short coats became the pre-
ferred attire for all mounted men
during the war.
In regard to the trooper’s “sec-
ond self,” i.e., his horse, good
maintenance of the creature was
essential. It had to be constantly
well groomed to keep its body free
from oils that could cause sores
and thus disease. A horse had to
be fed properly; too much water orgrass would disable it
with stomach prob-
lems. Horses improp-
erly shod would go
lame and be unser-
viceable. Animals
ridden too much
were prone to
develop bad backs.
(As a result, “riding to
war” on a horse
would be as
much walking the
mount as riding it.
Horse care
was especially
important
to the
Southern
cavalrymanbecause the animal he
rode was his property.
He was paid 40 cents a
day by the Confederate
government for its use. If
his horse were killed in com-
bat he would be paid the
horse’s pre-muster value.
The trooper would then
have to procure another
steed, or mule, or risk
being transferred to
the infantry.
In the employment of
weapons the Eastern and
Western Confed-
erate cavalries
differed.
Unlike the
horsemen in
Virginia, who were
prodded to use the
sword (usually a captured
or Southern-made copy of the
Model 1860 Light Cavalry Saber)
in mounted combat, the boys in
the West preferred the revolver,CONFEDERATE WESTERN CAVALRY
A first sergeant
under Forrest
carries Confederate
cavalry equipment.
Painting by Don Troiani, http://www.historicalartprints.comCWQ-Sum16 Wheeler's Raid_Layout 1 4/20/16 5:18 PM Page 58