sionary Ridge. Perched on these emi-
nences, and sheltered by earthworks,
Southern musket and artillery fire swept
the entire zone between the mountain
ranges and the city. To the rear of Rose-
crans’ army flowed the Tennessee River—
fast, wide, and deep. The Federal force
holed up in Chattanooga had only one
viable supply route back to Nashville, its
sole source of equipment and food. Union
soldiers controlled Bridgeport—the point
at which the Nashville & Chattanooga
Railroad crosses to the south side of the
Tennessee River—but Southern possession
of Lookout and Raccoon Mountains west
of Chattanooga commanded the railroad,
the river, and the shortest and best wagon
roads both north and south of the Ten-
nessee between the city and Bridgeport.
Although the distance between the two
places is only 26 miles, the Confederate
blocking units from Bragg’s command
required that all supplies to the Army of
the Cumberland be hauled by a circuitous
route north of the river, and over such
mountainous terrain that the actual dis-
tance involved was 60 miles.
The Union lifeline started at Nashville,
ran down the tracks of the Nashville &
Chattanooga Railroad to Stevenson, Ala.,
and ended its rail trip at Bridgeport. From
there all material was convoyed in wagons
northeast up the Sequatchie Valley to the
town of Jasper, and then on mountain
trails (referred to by many who used them
as little more than “pig paths”) leading
over Warden’s Ridge to the pontoon bridge
that spanned the Tennessee River to Chat-
tanooga. The rocky and uneven byways
and trails making up this triangular course
were so poor that it took a loaded wagon
10 days to make the 60-mile journey, and
that was in dry weather. When it rained
the paths turned into ribbons of flowing
mud, halting all movement by horse-
drawn vehicles. Further, the route through
the Sequatchie Valley traversed the coun-
ties of Marion, Rhea, and Bledsoe, areas
that had been stripped bare of forage and
feed for the teams of mules and horses
pulling needed supplies. As a result, many
draught animals did not survive the trip,and the wagons and goods they pulled had
to be destroyed or abandoned before
reaching the besieged Federals. For the
same reason, cattle herds driven through
the valley were decimated by starvation
before ever getting to Chattanooga. Those
that did survive were so thin and mal-
nourished they were called “beef dried on
the hoof,” more bone than meat. Finally,
the Sequatchie River, running down the
full length of Walden’s Ridge and empty-
ing into the Tennessee at Jasper, provided
another steep and muddy obstacle to
movement in the valley.
Meanwhile, the suffering of the men of
the Army of the Cumberland grew. As the
weeks went by rations were cut and then
cut again. The half rations the men lived
on included hard bread and the little beefthat got through to the city. Because food
was the priority item coming across the
Sequatchie Valley, clothes and shoes to
replace old and worn-out ones were not to
be had. Overcoats and blankets for the
coming cold-weather season were unavail-
able, as were horseshoes, saddles, and
horse blankets or anything else that could
make a mule or steed serviceable.
Food took precedence even over ammu-
nition. It was calculated by General
Ulysses S. Grant that by late October the
Army would not possess enough small-
arms bullets or artillery shells to fight more
than one day’s action. Fuel for the soldiers
was in very short supply. After fences and
houses in the city had been torn down and
used as firewood, the only other available
wood to be found was on the north side of
the Tennessee. But the lack of enoughworkable horseflesh prevented this vital
resource from being moved across the river
once it was cut. The same cause stopped
the transport of the wounded and the
artillery. The death of 10,000 mules and
horses by starvation during the siege par-
tially immobilized Chattanooga’s garrison.
With such losses in animals, and the weak-
ened condition of the troops owing to lack
of food, it is doubtful if the Army of the
Cumberland could have made a successful
retreat from Chattanooga, even if the
Rebels had allowed it.
Having a fair idea of the serious straits
his opponents were in, and determined to
make the situation worse, Bragg issued
orders to his cavalry commander, Maj.
Gen. Joseph Wheeler, on September 27 to
“cross the Tennessee River and press the
enemy, intercept and break-up all his lines
of communication and retreat.” In short,
Wheeler was to eliminate the Sequatchie
Valley corridor and make the isolation of
Rosecrans’ army complete.
“Fighting Joe” Wheeler had been
Bragg’s cavalry commander since July
1862—first in Bragg’s Army of Missis-
sippi, and then in the newly formed Army
of Tennessee, again under Bragg. Born in
Augusta, Ga., on September 10, 1836, he
was educated in Connecticut and went on
to enter the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point in 1854. Graduating with the class of
1859, Wheeler ranked 18th in a class of- Assigned to the Regiment of Mounted
Rifles (the future U.S. Third Cavalry Reg-
iment) in New Mexico, the young lieu-
tenant resigned his commission in early
1861 and joined the Confederate Army in
April of that year. First serving in the
artillery and then made colonel of an
infantry regiment, Wheeler returned to
cavalry duty on Bragg’s insistence. He
would be a horse soldier for the rest of the
war, proving to be one of the Confeder-
acy’s best commanders of mounted troops.
Before starting his raid around Chat-
tanooga, Wheeler first cleared Lookout
Mountain of enemy troops in order to
allow Rebel pickets to occupy that strate-
gic height. During this operation Wheeler
explained to Bragg that his command was
“We are about thirty
thousand brave and
determined men;
but our fate is in the
hands of God.”
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