Civil_War_Quarterly_-_Summer_2016_

In support of the drive on Richmond,

Grant called for a move from western Vir-

ginia into the Shenandoah Valley to divert

attention from Meade’s effort, tying down

much-needed Confederate troops. One of

the richest and most productive regions in

the South, the Shenandoah, called “the

Breadbasket of the Confederacy,” is cradled

between the Allegheny and Blue Ridge

Mountains. Approximately 125 miles long,

the valley stretches from Martinsburg, West

Virginia, to Staunton in southern Virginia.

The headwaters of the Shenandoah River

rise 10 miles below Staunton and flow

northward to its confluence with the

Potomac River at Harpers Ferry. The topog-

raphy of the countryside gives rise to some

odd local terminology. Because the river

flowed from south to north, the northern

end is referred to as the Lower Valley and

the southern end as the Upper Valley.

Hence, to travel north was considered going

down the valley, and moving south was

considered going up the valley.

Grant’s plan called for a Union column

under Brig. Gen. George Crook to attack

the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, one

of Lee’s vital lifelines, and seize the key

transportation center at Staunton. A sec-

ond column, 9,000 men strong, would tear

up the rail line and descend on the major

Confederate supply depot at Lynchburg.

In command of the second column was

Maj. Gen. Edward O.C. Ord, supported—

somewhat reluctantly—by Maj. Gen.

Franz Sigel.

With the 1864 presidential election

looming, Abraham Lincoln had specifi-

cally asked the War Department to give

Sigel an important and visible command.

Sigel’s influence with the burgeoning Ger-

man community in St. Louis had been

instrumental in electing Lincoln in 1860.

The military commander’s resume was

mixed, at best, at this stage of the war. His

military reputation was in almost inverse

proportion to his political usefulness and

ability to attract recruits. “I’m going to

fight mit Sigel,” German recruits would

boast. When the war broke out, Sigel was

commissioned a colonel in the 3rd Infantry

Regiment in St. Louis. He got off to a bad

start at the Battles of Carthage and Wil-

son’s Creek, but despite his poor showings

Sigel was promoted to brigadier general,

further underscoring his prominence as a

political general.

Siegel redeemed himself to a degree at

the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, in

March 1862, deftly handling Union

artillery. He was given another star and

transferred to the eastern theater of war.

He led a division and then a corps in the

Shenandoah Valley, where he was part of

a collective thumping at the hands of Con-

federate Maj. Gen. Thomas “Stonewall”

Jackson at the Battle of Second Manassas.

He then took command of the largely Ger-

man XI Corps of the Army of the Potomac

but was abruptly relieved of command in

February 1863. Since then, Sigel had been

exiled to a minor post in Pennsylvania.

Sigel was more or less forced on Grant.

Well aware of the German’s deficiencies,

Grant sought to limit his involvement

without creating a political fuss. He ulti-

mately decided to give Sigel an adminis-

trative and logistical support role, with

troops in the field to be commanded by

Ord. The attack on the railroad was given

first priority, while Sigel’s role was largely

diversionary. Grant explained Sigel’s part

in the campaign to Sherman. “I don’t

expect much from Sigel’s movement,”

wrote Grant to his confidant. “I don’t cal-

culate on very great results.” Quoting Lin-

coln, Grant continued, “If Sigel can’t skin

himself, he can hold a leg while someone

else does.”

In stark contrast to Sigel’s career, former

U.S. Vice President John C. Breckinridge

had performed admirably on the battle-

field. The Kentucky native had seen his

first major action at the Battle of Shiloh in

April 1862, where he commanded a

brigade of Kentucky troops, the soon to be

famous “Orphan Brigade.” His actions at

Shiloh earned Breckinridge a promotion to

major general and the respect of his men

and fellow officers. As a hard and desper-

ate fighter, he had few, if any, superiors in

either army. In early March, he was given

command of all Confederate forces in the

Shenandoah Valley and asked to cover a

vast geographical department that

stretched from West Virginia to south-

western Virginia and parts of Tennessee

and Kentucky. “I trust you will drive the

enemy back,” Lee wrote to Breckinridge.

To do so, the former vice president had less

than 5,000 troops at his disposal.

Ord, by contrast, was to have more than

9,500 men in his command, including

8,000 infantry provided by Sigel. But Sigel

bridled at his support role and in the end

sent Ord only 6,500 men. When Ord

asked him to bring up supplies, Sigel

responded, in effect, “I don’t think I shall

do it.” Ord soon tired of Sigel’s foot drag-

ging and resigned his command on April

17, which was probably what Sigel was

angling for in the first place. The German

happily took over the column, moving

south from Martinsburg on April 29. His

All: Library of Congress

Principal commanders at New Market included, left to right, Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, Union Maj. Gen.

Franz Sigel, and Maj. Gen. John D. Imboden, a native of nearby Staunton, Virginia.

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