advance. Despite continued evidence of the
enemy’s weakness, Sigel lost any sense of
urgency, preferring to maintain a rigid rou-
tine of drill, inspection, and review—even
staging mock battles to gauge how his
troops would behave under fire. According
to an officer in the 116th Ohio, such point-
less posturing “bred in everyone the most
supreme contempt for General Sigel. Not
an officer or man retained a spark of respect
for, or confidence in, him.”
Sigel’s sloth-like advance was exacer-
bated by the need to detach large numbers
of troops to deal with the threat posed by
Confederate partisan raiders John Mosby
and John “Hanse” McNeill, who were ter-
rorizing Sigel’s lines of supply and com-
munication. Despite the incessant raiding
and mounted clashes, Sigel’s main body
advanced to Woodstock on May 11. A
sharp skirmish there drove the Confeder-
ate defenders from the town in such haste
that they left behind several unsent
telegrams written by Breckinridge and
intended for Imboden. These communica-
tions revealed that several thousand Con-
federates were at that very moment com-
ing to his assistance but that Breckinridge
was still uncertain about Sigel’s destination
or purpose.
Having stumbled upon this invaluable
intelligence, Sigel could not be spurred to
action. Instead, he dispatched Colonel
William Boyd and 300 troopers of the 1st
New York Cavalry on a scouting mission
to secure Sigel’s left flank. Boyd soon ran
into another Confederate trap at New
Market Gap. The Southern troopers had
inflicted two severe reverses on Federal
forces in one week, and Sigel’s cavalry
would go into the coming battle seriously
weakened.
Meanwhile, on the morning of May 13,
some 40 miles away in Staunton, Breckin-
ridge announced that he was “determined
not to await Sigel’s coming, but to march
to meet him and give him battle wherever
found.” The Kentuckian had arrived in
town eight days earlier, mustering all the
militia in the area, and on May 10 he had
summoned the 264-man Corps of Cadets
from the Virginia Military Institute, freshfrom raising a commemorative flag at the
gravesite of Stonewall Jackson, who had
died exactly one year earlier. Breckinridge
asked the cadets to stand by to help repel
the Union invasion. Meanwhile, he was
joined by the veteran brigades of Brig.
Gens. John Echols and Gabriel Wharton,
totaling another 2,500 men. Including
Imboden’s men, Breckinridge now mus-
tered 4,816 men at arms.
As the Confederate column snaked
through Harrisonburg on May 14, the low
rumble of artillery and distant gunfire
announced the arrival of Sigel’s advance
guard at New Market. Colonel Augustus
Moor, commander of the 1st Brigade, was
ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in
force to probe Imboden’s position and
seize the small crossroads village if possi-
ble. Moor did so, driving the thin gray line
of defenders four miles southwest of town
onto a commanding eminence called
Shirley’s Hill.
The day’s running skirmish settled into a
brief but furious artillery duel. Fitful fight-
ing continued throughout the night. “It
had been raining all day and continued all
night, a cold rain that soaked us to the
skin,” remembered a soldier in the 123rd
Ohio. “We remained in line all night,
sleeping but little on the cold, muddy
ground. It was one of the most uncom-
fortable nights I ever spent.” As darkness
fell, Moor’s brigade of roughly 2,300 men,
fully one-third of the army, dug in north-
west of town on a slightly lower rise called
Manor’s Hill.
The battlefield at New Market was abox-like peninsula defined by Shirley’s Hill
on the south, Bushong’s Hill on the north,
the Shenandoah River on the west, and
Smith’s Creek to the east. The terrain
would force the Federals to fight on a nar-
row front, and the rains flooded the local
streams, rendering them impassable. It was
on the far western point of the constricted
land corridor at Bushong’s Hill that Sigel’s
army would deploy for battle, but as Sun-
day, May 15, dawned, he was still 20 miles
away at Woodstock.
Sunrise gave a clear view of the field, and
Breckinridge studied it carefully with his
binoculars. Satisfied that the enemy had
no immediate offensive intentions, the
Kentuckian declared: “We can attack and
whip him here. I’ll do it.” Artillery began
barking back and forth as Breckinridge
made his final dispositions on the northern
slope of Shirley’s Hill, out of Federal view.
It would be an assault in depth, with
Wharton’s brigade on the left, Echols’s
brigade on the right, and the 62nd Virginia
Mounted Infantry holding the center. The
VMI cadets, whose spruce uniforms had
drawn catcalls of “Katydids!” and “Rock-
a-bye Baby!” from the amused veterans,
formed in reserve, constituting Breckin-
ridge’s last line.
Just before the Confederate infantry
stepped off, Breckinridge spurred his horse
up to the young cadets. “Young gentle-
men,” he said, “I hope there will be no
occasion to use you, but if there is, I trust
you will do your duty.” Commandant Lt.
Col. Scott Shipp ordered the Corps’ white
battle flag unfurled while the band struckAll: Virginia Military InstituteLeft to right, VMI Commandant Lt. Col. Scott Shipp, 17-year-old cadet Thomas G. Jefferson, and Cadet Jack
Stanard. The two cadets were mortally wounded in the battle.CWQ-Sum16 New Market_Layout 1 4/20/16 4:18 PM Page 78