around, they could see a dark line of blue-
coated troops still filing across the bridge.
Closer at hand, they came under a sput-
tering fire from Confederate pickets. Cun-
ningham heard the “lumberman voice” of
his brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Hiram
Burnham, booming, “Heave after them—
double quick!”
Cunningham’s men rushed forward and
drove the enemy pickets from a shallow
line of trenches. “The crack of our seven-
shooters, the cheering of our men as they
pursued the surprised ‘Johnnies’ through
the woods; the beauty of the morning and
its bracing air; the forest clad in autumnal
colors—all added spirit and enthusiasm,”
wrote the major. Dashing through an
abandoned camp, where breakfast was left
cooking, Cunningham’s men came within
sight of Fort Harrison. In the glare of the
early morning, the Rebel fort loomed up in
the sunlight with heavy guns dotting its
parapet.
Butler’s moves took the Confederates
unaware, but before sunup pickets alerted
Ewell that the Federals were across theriver. Ewell in turn notified Lee at Peters-
burg about the impending attack. Lee
immediately sent Maj. Gen. Charles Field’s
division from Petersburg. Field’s men trav-
eled by rail as far as possible and then
marched across a pontoon bridge spanning
the James. After Field set out, Lee dis-
patched Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke with
more troops to follow him. Artillery com-
mander Brig. Gen. Edward P. Alexander
was ordered to bring as many guns as he
could safely remove from other points and
join Ewell. Lee also telegraphed Secretary
of War James Seddon, asking him to call
up the militia and local troops available in
Richmond. Even with these reinforcements
on the way, Ewell faced several more hours
of stalling a greatly superior enemy force.
Affairs were serious enough as it was,
but Ewell made a miscalculation that put
the capital in even greater danger. If Ord
decided to move up the bank of the James,
he might take Signal Hill and come upon
Chaffin’s Bluff from the south. At the bluff,
a vital pontoon bridge linked the Confed-
erates north of the river with those sta-tioned around Petersburg. Unaware that
the Federals were aiming for Fort Harri-
son, Ewell shuffled a large portion of his
available force down to Signal Hill, two
miles from the fort. Stannard’s division
loomed before Fort Harrison. There was a
real danger that the Federals could punch
through the lightly held fort then roll up
long stretches of the neighboring works by
flank attacks or by circling from the rear.
Richmond was in great peril.
Fort Harrison was an earthwork one mile
east of Chaffin’s Bluff and two miles west of
the works stormed by Paine’s division. The
Confederates had named the fort after Lieu-
tenant William Elzey Harrison, the engineer
officer who started the original works on
the site in 1862. Harrison laid out a line
including 15 batteries. His original Batter-
ies 7, 8 and 9 were enlarged and combined
into what became Fort Harrison. To
strengthen these works, which defended
Richmond from the southeast and shielded
the batteries overlooking the James River at
Chaffin’s Bluff, a new system of strongholds
went up behind Fort Harrison. To the northBoth: Library of CongressCWQ-EW16 Chaffins Bluff_Layout 1 10/23/15 2:43 PM Page 23