ernment orders. Adams was kept in the
dark. Meanwhile, the mood inside the
American legation in London was so tense,
said one observer, that it “would have
gorged a glutton of gloom.” Adams’ own
son Henry stormed, “Good God, what’s
got into you all? What in hell do you mean
by deserting now the great principles of
our fathers; by returning to the vomit of
that dog Great Britain? What do you mean
by asserting now principles against which
every Adams yet has protested and
resisted? You’re mad, all of you.”
Back in Washington during the first week
of December, many were hopeful that
Britain would take no action in the wake of
the Trentseizures. The arrival of British
newspapers on December 13 changed all
that, leaving no doubt that Her Majesty’s
government would demand reparations and
that Wilkes was thought to have acted
unlawfully. Secretary of State Seward had
openly favored war with Britain as a means
of uniting the divided country. He thought
the South would drop their brothers’ quar-
rel and support the nation against the for-
eign power. Clearly he was mistaken, since
one of the South’s main aims was to draw
Britain into the conflict on their side, with
the hope that France would follow. Lincoln,
for his part, had doubted the wisdom of
Wilkes’ actions from the start, fearing that
“the traitors will prove to be white ele-
phants.” Still new to international affairs,
the president was willing to leave the mat-
ter in Seward’s hands—for the time being,
anyway.
Seward soon found that what he
thought he had wanted—war with Great
Britain—was not an open-and-shut mat-
ter. Seward now saw, as did Lincoln, that
what Wilkes had done in stopping Trent
and removing the two Confederate diplo-
mats was no different from what the
British had done to American ships before
the War of 1812. They had to stick to the
principle of the rights of neutrality at sea.
“One war at a time,” said Lincoln, and
Seward agreed. Still, they had no wish to
antagonize public opinion and said noth-
ing publicly. In his December 1 message to
Congress, Lincoln did not even mentionthe Trentaffair, much to the surprise of the
body’s members.
On December 18, just before midnight,
an exhausted Captain Conway finally
reached Lord Lyons’ house in Washington.
At 3 PMthe next day Lyons presented him-
self at Seward’s office and delivered the
queen’s letter. Seward asked Lyons what
would happen if they refused the stated
demands or asked for more discussions.
Lyons replied, “My instructions were pos-
itive and left me no discretion.” Seward
asked for more time; it could not be done
in seven days. Lyons agreed to come back
in two days, when the clock to war would
start ticking. Going home, Lyons doubted
that an extension of time would make
much difference. He sent a coded telegram
to Admiral Milne to make ready to evac-uate the legation staff to Canada.
Returning to Seward on Saturday,
December 21, Lyons was confronted with
another request for two more days. Lyons
was not the type to ignore his instructions,
but he realized that Seward was in a tight
corner. He also knew that a letter from
France formally supporting Britain’s posi-
tion would arrive later that day. A new
appointment was set for Monday, but
Lyons made it clear that this must be the
final meeting on the matter. On December
23, Lyons officially delivered Russell’s let-
ter to Seward at the State Department.
There was no immediate reply. Lyons had
done all he could to help the Americans by
delaying, but now the clock was ticking.
Seward got Lincoln to call a cabinet
meeting for Christmas Day, at which
copies of Russell’s letter were given to the
members. It soon became apparent that
most were against releasing the Confeder-
ate envoys. Massachusetts Senator Charles
Sumner spoke up, saying that the release of
the prisoners would be political suicide;
arbitration was the only possible course.
However, even as Sumner was speaking
news arrived of the official French support
for Britain. The room was stunned. Attor-
ney General Edward Bates pointed out
that Sumner’s suggestion would not work.
Britain’s navy would crush their own and
ruin overseas trade, and the nation would
be bankrupt. There was already a run on
the banks. The cabinet adjourned in the
afternoon, agreeing to reconvene the next
day. Lincoln, still clinging to the notion of
international arbitration of the crisis,
asked Seward to present his arguments on
compliance in writing the next day, and he
would do the same for the arbitration case.
By the next day, most of the cabinet
members had come around to Seward’s
view that the United States had little choice
but to comply with British demands.
Seward had been up all night drafting a
26-page response to Lord Russell in which
he clearly laid the blame on Captain
Wilkes and his failure to take Trentto a
prize court. Seward showed the draft to
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase,
who seconded the idea of releasing theOther key players in the Trentcontroversy,
clockwise, from top left, included Charles Fran-
cis Adams, American ambassador to Great
Britain; Lord Lyons, British ambassador to the
United States; and Prince Albert, husband and
consort of Queen Victoria.All: Library of CongressCWQ-EW16 Trent Affair_Layout 1 10/22/15 1:19 PM Page 36