Mudge withdrew the bulk of the regiment
to McAllister’s Woods, Fox made a bold
showing and called out to the Confeder-
ates to surrender. The outnumbered Fed-
erals were met with an eruption of mus-
ketry that lit up the hillside, and Company
K was likewise withdrawn.
Members of the 27th Indiana stood a
respectable distance away and listened to
an impromptu meeting of senior officers
inside McAllister’s Woods. Colgrove argued
for an immediate attack to recapture the
works; Ruger demurred, noting that the
gathering darkness would compound the
difficulty of carrying the works, which were
occupied by an unknown number of Con-
federates. Williams believed that his men
should sit tight until daybreak when “we
will shell hell out of them.”
When informed that much of XII Corps’
breastworks had been occupied by the
enemy, Slocum responded, “Well, drive
them out at daylight,” an order that
Williams felt was “more easily made than
executed.” As acting corps commander, it
fell to Williams to develop a tactical plan
for the following morning. The general
ultimately decided to make the main thrust
with his left wing. Ruger’s 1st Division,
which occupied the right, would hold a
“threatening position” but only push the
Rebels “should opportunity offer.”
Williams judged the Confederate left flank
opposite Colgrove’s brigade “quite
impregnable for assault.”
At daybreak, Williams unleashed his hell-
ish barrage, and when the firing ceased,
Johnson launched an ill-fated assault on
Culp’s Hill. Meanwhile, Colgrove’s men
were subject to a nagging fire from Con-
federate skirmishers. To the north of Span-
gler’s Meadow, six companies of the 1st
North Carolina were scattered among an
outcropping of boulders near the base of
the lower hill. To their left, the 2nd Virginia
was positioned behind a stone wall that ran
perpendicular to the captured breastworks.
Across Rock Creek, the remaining four
companies of the 1st North Carolina were
concealed on the hillside and in the farm
buildings of Zebulon Taney and, in the
words of one Federal, “annoyed us terriblyby their skillful marksmanship.”
At 7 AM, matters were made worse for the
Federals when the Confederate position was
reinforced by the Virginia brigade of Brig.
Gen. William “Extra Billy” Smith. A pro-
fessional politician, Smith was a former
member of the Confederate Congress and
since May 1863 had been the governor-elect
of Virginia. He was also a tough fighter,
thrice wounded in action, and respected by
his men. Smith personally led his soldiers
down the hill to the stone wall, where they
relieved the troops already on the scene. The
six 1st North Carolina companies retired
from Spangler’s Meadow; Colonel John
Nadenbusch led his 2nd Virginia across
Rock Creek to a position where they could
readily enfilade any Federal thrust across
the meadow. Nadenbusch, a miller from
Berkeley County, had received his appoint-
ment to the colonelcy in March, but both he
and his regiment were experienced veterans.
A contingent regiment of the famed
Stonewall Brigade, the troops had seen
action from the war’s outset.
Subsequent to Johnson’s unsuccessful
assault on Culp’s Hill, Slocum was con-
vinced that the Rebels were “becoming
shaky” and deemed a counterattack inorder. Bypassing Williams, Slocum ordered
Ruger to assault the captured works with
two of his regiments. The cautious Ruger
requested that a reconnaissance be carried
out first to ascertain the actual strength of
the enemy on the lower hill. Slocum
assented, and Ruger passed on verbal
orders to a staff officer, Lieutenant William
M. Snow. Colgrove was “to try the enemy
with two regiments, and if practicable, to
force him out.” Snow was dispatched
around 10 AM.
The subsequent conversation between
Snow and Colgrove remains a mystery.
Snow maintained that he delivered the ver-
bal orders exactly as they had been given
by Ruger, but Colgrove left the discussion
with Snow with an entirely different
impression. He claimed to have been
ordered to “advance your line immedi-
ately” and that he was given no discretion.
Colgrove was further under the deluded
impression that the division’s 1st Brigade
had mounted a successful counterattack to
his left and was in need of support.
Because of the narrow front that Spangler’s
Meadow afforded, Colgrove could only
deploy two of his regiments. He likewise
realized that throwing forward a skirmishLibrary of CongressConfederate troops in Brig. Gen. George Steuart’s brigade assault Culp’s Hill on the morning of July 2,- The Rebels captured and held the lower works, setting up a murderous counterattack by Union
forces the next day.
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