joined his commanding officer by a giant
sycamore tree near the Nashville Pike. The
personal animosity between the two men
was perhaps aggravated by their appear-
ances and personalities. Breckinridge,
with his long mustache and striking pro-
file, was possibly the handsomest general
in the Southern army. Bragg, with hisbushy beard and wrinkled face, was
undoubtedly the ugliest. While the dash-
ing Breckinridge was the epitome of a
Southern gentleman, Bragg’s blunt, critical
style made him a hard man to like and an
easy man to hate.
Now joined by his subordinate, Bragg
explained his proposed assault. The previ-ous day a Yankee detachment had crossed
Stones River at a spot called McFadden’s
Ford, occupying a large hill on the river’s
east bank, fronting Breckinridge’s com-
mand. The hill provided Rosecrans with a
natural artillery platform that could deci-
mate the right flank of Bragg’s proposed
attack. Before Bragg could launch Polk’s
assault, he insisted that Breckinridge take
that hill.
Breckinridge was stunned. He had just
returned from a reconnaissance of that
very hill and was convinced an attack
would be suicidal. Strong detachments of
Yankees were situated on and near the
grassy prominence. The Confederates
would have to attack over several hundred
yards of open fields subject to Union
artillery fire. Union reserves might be
massed to the rear of the hill. Even if he
took the hill, it was flanked by a taller hill
across the river to the northwest. Yankee
artillery placed on this far hill could make
things hot for his men, even if they man-
aged to capture the near hill. Warming to
his argument, Breckinridge began to trace
the position in the dirt when Bragg stopped
him. “Sir, my information is different. I
have given the order to attack the enemy in
your front and expect it to be obeyed.”
That ended the discussion. The assault
would go forward as planned. Bragg
ordered Breckinridge to attack with his own
four brigades at 4 PM—just 90 minutes
away. Bragg assured the Kentuckian that he
had arranged for two dismounted cavalry
brigades to advance on his right. He also
advised Breckinridge that his division’s three
artillery batteries would be supplemented
by two batteries (10 guns) under the com-
mand of Captain Felix Robertson. All five
batteries were to advance with the infantry.
Once the infantry had taken the hill, the bat-
teries would unlimber. The men were to
entrench, securing the position. The
infantry was not to advance beyond the hill.
By starting the attack 45 minutes before
sunset, Bragg calculated that the Federals
would not have time to organize a coun-
terattack to retake the hill before night-
fall. The next morning, strengthened by
breastworks, the Confederate artilleryBreckinridge’s Confederates attacked the Federals, who were holding a ridge east of the Stones River.Map © 2015 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MNCWQ-EW16 Stone's River_Layout 1 10/22/15 1:14 PM Page 50