Unless they stopped, the Yankees would
sweep them from the field. Riding into the
crisis, General Preston rallied some troops
on the Rebel right by vigorously swatting
the routing men with his saber. Another
knot of soldiers formed around the 20th
Tennessee’s Sergeant Battle, who raised the
regimental flag after the color-bearer was
shot down. Preston praised the sergeant
who immediately “seized the colors and
bravely rallied the men under my eye.”
On the left, Colonel Joseph Lewis of the
6th Kentucky saw his own color-bearer
fall. But Adjutant Samuel Buchanan—
noted Lewis—“with the chivalry that ever
characterizes him in battle,” immediately
picked up the 6th Kentucky’s flag. The
colonel called for a volunteer to take the
colors and Private Adams bravely stepped
forward to receive the flag. As the various
regimental flags appeared along the edge
of the woods, enough men rallied to the
colors to set up a scratch defensive line.
They were reinforced by one of the two
missing-in-action cavalry brigades and
Robertson’s uncommitted six-gun battery.
The Union line approached this final
position and halted. The scattered fire
from the Rebel units and the gathering
darkness deterred any further Union
advance. The Federals pulled back to their
original lines.
The first battle of the new year was over.
With the repulse of this attack (Breckin-
ridge lost 1,500 men, the Federals 700),
Bragg decided that a further stand at
Murfreesboro was untenable. He would
shortly retreat to his Tullahoma, Tenn.,
position, leaving Rosecrans with a messy
but sorely needed victory.
Meanwhile, in the south, the Battle of
Stones River raged on long after the fight-
ing ceased. Bragg was furious with several
subordinates whose actions, he believed,
had cost him a brilliant victory. Prominent
on the list was Breckinridge. Not coinci-
dentally, the accused officers thought that
Bragg had single-handedly lost Stones
River. A postbattle explosion occurred
almost immediately.
In response to adverse newspaper criti-
cism, Bragg circulated a memo to his divi-sion and corps commanders asking for
their views on the army’s retreat, which his
subordinates interpreted as requesting a
vote of confidence. Breckinridge joined two
other generals in writing Bragg that they
no longer trusted his judgment, suggesting
he resign for the good of the army. An
angry Bragg refused. President Jefferson
Davis ordered General Joseph Johnston to
investigate the matter, which he did, ulti-
mately supporting Bragg in this dispute.
Now it was Bragg’s turn. Without wait-
ing for the postbattle submissions from his
generals, Bragg sent a secret battle report to
the War Department in which he faulted anumber of officers. In particular, Bragg was
upset with Breckinridge’s performance on
both December 31 and January 2. As to the
January 2 attack, Bragg felt that Breckin-
ridge failed to coordinate the assistance of
the dismounted cavalry units on his right
flank, despite reminders from Bragg to do
just that. In addition, he thought Breckin-
ridge’s overall execution of the attack had
been poorly handled, resulting in the loss of
unit cohesion as his troops reached the hill.
Breckinridge soon found out about
Bragg’s critical report, but his request for
a copy was denied. Not until after it was
printed in a Richmond newspaper (with
Bragg’s help) did Breckinridge get a chance
to read the controversial document.
Enraged, Breckinridge sent a letter to Gen-
eral Samuel Cooper, Adjutant Inspector
General of the Confederacy, in which he
complained that the failure of his men to
hold the position they had carried “was
due to no fault of theirs or mine, but to the
fact that they were commanded to do an
impossible thing.” Breckinridge then had
this letter printed in the Richmond papers,much to Bragg’s chagrin.
The argument as to who was right goes
on to this day. While many historians sym-
pathize with Breckinridge, the fact is that
the Rebels captured Bragg’s hill despite
Breckinridge’s pessimism and tactical mis-
takes concerning cavalry support and
troop disposition. Had Breckinridge kept
his men from advancing beyond the hill
crest, it is possible they could have weath-
ered Mendenhall’s artillery bombardment
for the 10 minutes needed until darkness
would have ended the battle.
Regardless of who was right, this per-
sonal war did not bode well for the Armyof Tennessee. In late May 1863, Bragg got
Breckinridge transferred to Mississippi.
Bragg had a second division commander
court-martialed, and bullied a third into
nearly resigning. If Bragg thought he had
eliminated or cowed his enemies, he was
mistaken. Both corps commanders and
many subordinate officers still hated him.
Moreover, a need for reinforcements
would reunite Breckinridge with Bragg
nine months later at the Battle of Chicka-
mauga. While the Army of Tennessee
would win its greatest victory at that
bloody stream, it could not escape the
after-battle bickering that again erupted
between Bragg and his generals. The result
would be the disaster at Missionary Ridge
on November 25, 1863, and, finally,
Bragg’s own removal from command of
the Army of Tennessee.Jim Heenehan has previously published
articles on the Civil War. He is an attorney
for the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, and a member of the Old Baldy
Civil War Roundtable of Philadelphia.The guns belched out DEATH to the
nearest YANKEES and then the men tried
to relimber. TOO LATE!The Federals
were in among them and only two of the
four guns managed to ESCAPE.
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