easily commanded the shipping channel,
half a mile wide and 21 feet deep. About
three miles to the westward rose Dauphin
Island, on the eastern point of which was
Fort Gaines with 26 guns, which com-
manded Pelican Channel, actually a shal-
lows projecting two miles toward the
shipping channel.
To strengthen and improve the defenses,
the Confederates had thrown up obstruc-
tions, extending in the shallows from Fort
Gaines eastward toward Fort Morgan.
Off the obstructions, in deeper water, a
row of black buoys marked three stag-
gered lines of mines, which were then
called torpedoes. They reached directly
across the main channel to within 500
yards of Mobile Point, so that passing
ships, in order to skirt the minefield, had
to pass directly under the guns of Fort
Morgan. Farragut well understood the full
significance of the ominous black buoys,
but he was confident that the sub-
mersibles, encrusted with barnacles, theirpowder damp, were waterlogged and
powerless. He also believed a good many
had drifted from their moorings. But the
danger could not be ignored or taken
lightly, and with that in mind Farragut
sent boat crews out at night to find the
buoys, then fumble around until they
located the mines anchored a few feet
under the water. When found, they would
be either sunk or removed.
Formidable as it all looked, the old
admiral was not impressed. “I am satis-
fied,” he wrote to Secretary Welles, “that
if I had one ironclad at this time I could
destroy their whole force in the bay,” and
with 5,000 cooperating soldiers from the
army, “reduce the forts at my leisure.” The
Tennessee native, who was perhaps the
best naval officer on either side, based his
superb tactics on an analysis of his short-
comings as well as those of his opponent.
This 54-year veteran of the Navy under-
stood the limitations of land fortifications,
and both on the Mississippi River and atMobile Bay he used this tactical under-
standing flawlessly. It is revealing that in all
of his communications with Secretary
Welles during this period, Farragut’s first
consideration was the condition of his
opponents, and even more revealing that
he was willing to act upon his perception
of their weaknesses.
This was another indication of Far-
ragut’s best-case or optimistic approach to
the conduct of war. It was easy to see an
opponent’s strengths, but Farragut took a
step beyond and tried to comprehend his
opponent’s problems and limitations. He
was also very aware that, about 130 miles
north of Mobile—at Selma—the Confed-
erates had built one of their largest naval
stations. Confederate Secretary of the
Navy Stephen Mallory, intent that Mobile
not be lost and responding to cries of
alarm from the governor of Alabama, con-
tracted for two floating batteries in May
1862, the Huntsvilleand the Tuscaloosa.
Originally planned as ironclads, their
engines proved inadequate. Barely able to
stem the weak current, the ships clearly
could not confront the enemy in open bat-ABOVE: The forecastle of the USS Hartford. This reliable sailing vessel was Farragut’s flagship and
served him well in the battle. OPPOSITE TOP: Confederate Admiral Franklin “Ol’ Buck” Buchanan.
OPPOSITE BOTTOM: Union Admiral David G. Farragut.Library of CongressCWQ-EW16 Mobile Bay_Layout 1 10/22/15 1:09 PM Page 59