River, New Orleans would panic and
might be lost to the Union. Thus a naval
stalemate developed off Mobile that was
to last for the next month and a half. In
addition to the Tennessee, Buchanan had
three wooden gunboats somewhat com-
parable to Farragut’s lighter ships. They
were the Morgan, Gaines, and Selma, with
a total of 22 guns, including four very
effective Brooke rifles, yet they had been
converted from river steamers, and their
light construction made them poorly suited
for the rigors of battle. The greatest faith
was in the Tennessee. She was a very pow-
erful ironclad—but her most serious defi-
ciency was that she was alone. The South
held absurdly high hopes for her.
Buchanan wrote to a friend, “Everybody
has taken it into their heads that one ship
can whip a dozen, and if the trial is not
made, we who are in her are damned for
life, consequently the trial must be made.
So goes the world.”
Tennesseewas a formidable obstacle,
which Farragut would find across his path
on the day he determined to attack. To his
son, the admiral wrote, “Buchanan has a
vessel which he says is superior to the Mer-
rimac, with which he intends to attack
us.... So we are to have no child’s play.”
By the spring of 1864, the Yankees
bossed the Mississippi River system, West
Virginia, Tennessee, Virginia north of the
Rapidan River, parts of Louisiana, and
most of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. But
the bulk of the Confederacy was still
intact. Rebel arms controlled the Shenan-
doah Valley, and two powerful armies—
Lee’s in Virginia and Joe Johnston’s in
Georgia—remained defiant. Grant with an
army twice the size of Lee’s advanced
toward Richmond, but was repulsed with
bloody losses in May at the Battles of the
Wilderness and Spotsylvania, and in June
at Cold Harbor. General Sherman and his
“bummers,” 80,000 strong, pushed off
from Chattanooga, plunging into the Deep
South toward Atlanta. With Atlanta in
sight, Sherman wanted to prevent the Con-
federate troops in southern Alabama from
moving to Johnston’s aid.
Although not yet prepared to roll thedice, Farragut was at least ready to shake
them and, eager to help, he decided he
could assist Sherman by pretending to force
an entrance into Mobile Bay. On Febru-
ary 13, he sent six mortars to the west of
Dauphin Island to attack the small, weak,
and unfinished Fort Powell. The mortars,
supported by four gunboats, put up a fierce
display. Confederate General Dabney
Maury, military commander of the district,
bought the ruse, panicked, and asked Rich-
mond for more troops. Thus, any intention
of siphoning off troops from Mobile to
defend against Sherman was dropped, and
Farragut had accomplished something at
the cost of a few mortar shells.
Farragut, who up to this time had been
scornful of ironclads and now faced an
imminent meeting with one, had a touch of
“ram fever.” His reports to Secretary
Welles of the appearance of the Tennessee
in the lower bay produced prompt action.
Welles ordered the ironclad Manhattanto
leave the naval yard at Norfolk and report
to Farragut; soon a second ironclad, the
Tecumseh, received the same orders. Fur-
thermore, Admiral David Porter was
ordered to send Farragut two light-draft
ironclads from the Mississippi Squadron—
the Winnebagoand Chickasaw.
All were formidable vessels of the Mon-
itor class, but much more powerful than
the famed prototype. The Manhattanand
Tecumsehdisplaced 2,100 tons, were 225
feet long, and had much stronger armor
than had been used earlier. Their most
important asset was their ordnance—each
had two gigantic 15-inch Dahlgrens—the
same caliber used by the 40,000-ton bat-
tleships of World War II—capable of firing
projectiles weighing more than 430
pounds. The twin-turreted, quadruple-
screwed river monitors, although built to
operate in shallow inland waters, would
prove themselves extremely efficient. They
were 229 feet long, displaced 1,300 tons,
and held four 11-inch Dahlgrens.
The arrival of the first monitor was the
signal for Farragut to prepare his ships in
earnest for the attack. The old admiral
must have sensed that fortune had brought
the well-nigh impossible of three monthsago within the reach of his courageous
grasp, and so convinced was he of the
ripeness of the moment, he refused to pro-
crastinate. To increase pressure on Joe
Johnston’s army, early in June Sherman
wired General Edward Canby, who had
relieved Banks after his dismal Red River
campaign, and asked him to raise a ruckus
with Farragut at Mobile. On June 17 Gen-
eral Canby conferred with Farragut, and
on July 3 sent him General Gordon
Granger with 2,400 troops, to land in the
rear and invest Fort Gaines. They were all
that could be spared at the time, because
General Canby had been ordered to send
reinforcements to the Army of the
Potomac, which would eventually operate
in the Shenandoah Valley under General
Phil Sheridan.
General Page, who commanded at Fort
Morgan, was convinced his firepower was
inadequate, although General Maury was
certain that the forts, obstructions, and the
Tennessee would obliterate Farragut’s
squadron. Farragut was obviously expect-
ing the hottest contest of his career. “I
know Buchanan and Page, both officers of
known merit in the old navy, will do all in
their power to destroy us, and we will rec-
iprocate the compliment. I hope to give
them a fair fight, if I once get inside,” he
wrote to his son.
Fort Morgan, built in 1818 as part of the
coastal defense program begun after the
disastrous British landing in the War of
1812, was obsolete in 1864 and unable to
withstand the fire of powerful rifled guns.
However, the weakest aspect of the fort
was the Mobile Point peninsula. Low and
sandy, it presented no obstacle to the land-
ing of troops seeking to take Fort Morgan
from the rear. Moreover, despite the fear
the torpedoes inspired, they were the
weakest point of the Mobile Bay defenses.
According to the Confederate commander
of the Corps of Engineers, the Prussian
Victor von Sheliha, they were anchored on
shifting sands and unstable gravel. Fur-
thermore, the Confederates had also been
obliged to leave a 500-yard gap between
Fort Morgan and the torpedo field to
allow passage of blockade-runners.CWQ-EW16 Mobile Bay_Layout 1 10/22/15 1:09 PM Page 61