war. Jackson felt that his only options were
to either intercept Banks before he could
join forces with McClellan or else cause a
major disruption in the Shenandoah Valley
that would pull forces away from McClel-
lan, threaten Washington, and stall the
campaign on the Virginia Peninsula. For
Jackson, it was time to march back to
Winchester and fight.
Early in the morning of March 23, Jack-
son and his men began their march toward
the Winchester area. Covering roughly 15
miles through the valley, Jackson halted
the advance around 2 PM, one mile outside
of Kernstown and three miles south of
Winchester. He ordered his men to set up
tents. All the regiments except for Colonel
John A. Campbell’s 48th Virginia, which
was the rear guard, arrived within a mile
or two of Kernstown that afternoon. Jack-
son originally had no intention of engag-
ing the enemy on the 23rd, but additional
information presented to him during the
morning march caused him to reconsider.
Ashby passed along word from usually
reliable Winchester sources that the Fed-
erals had only four regiments left inside the
town and that even those forces were plan-
ning to withdraw shortly to Harpers Ferry.
Even so, Jackson felt that attacking the
enemy immediately was not the most pru-
dent decision; early Monday morning
would be better. But when Jackson and his
men arrived outside Kernstown, he noticed
that their positions were visible to the Union
soldiers on the opposite heights and there-
fore they were already compromised and
vulnerable. “I concluded that it would be
dangerous to postpone it until the next day,
as re-enforcements might be brought up
during the night,” Jackson reported after-
ward. “I determined to advance at once.”
The Union side of the battle would not,
in fact, be commanded by Shields. The day
before, Shields had been severely wounded
in a skirmish with Ashby’s men when an
artillery shell exploded nearby and a frag-
ment struck Shields in the upper arm,
breaking the bone. The wound was severe
enough to cause Shields to leave the field.
Senior regimental officer Colonel Nathan
Kimball, an Indiana physician, took com-mand of the division. Kimball, like Shields,
was an experienced Mexican War veteran,
a hero of the Battle of Buena Vista, but he
would be the third divisional commander
in three weeks. (The original commander,
Brig. Gen. Frederick Lander, had died of ill-
ness on March 2.) It was unclear whether
he could handle his men competently.
Early in the morning of the 23rd,
Ashby’s forces renewed the attack,advancing from Kernstown and occupy-
ing a position with their artillery batteries
on the heights to the right of the Valley
Turnpike leading into Winchester. Ashby
attempted to turn the Union flank, but
Kimball proved up to the task of com-
mand, directing the 8th and 67th Ohio
Regiments to meet the Confederates head-
on. His men held strong, driving the
Southern forces back through KernstownABOVE: Nathan Kimball, Richard Garnett, Turner Ashby, left to right. TOP: A member of the Pennsylva-
nia Light Artillery stands watch over the battery, two weeks before Kernstown. Sketch by Alfred Waud.All: Library of CongressCWQ-EW16 Kernstown_Layout 1 10/22/15 3:06 PM Page 93