Civil_War_Quarterly_-_Spring_2016_

and had the disadvantage of being on for-

eign ground. Jackson’s cavalry under the

dashing, often brilliant, sometimes irre-

sponsible Turner Ashby could hold an

effective screen in front of the Union

armies, keeping them nearly blind to any

movement of the Confederate infantry

beyond the riders. Several times Jackson’s

army “disappeared” so far as Union com-

manders could discern, an extremely dan-

gerous state of affairs for them.

And, of course, Jackson was working

“on his own ground.” He had been a pro-

fessor of natural and experimental philos-

ophy and of artillery tactics at the Virginia

Military Institute in Lexington, up the val-

ley 35 miles from Staunton. He knew the

territory, and he could rely on a populace

working on his behalf and against those of

the “invaders.” They would tell him of

Federal movements while, if discoursing to

Federals at all, disguising those of Jackson.

These Jackson all put to his advantage.

One other point. Jackson in late March

called to his tent Jedediah Hotchkiss, a 34-

year-old teacher and transplanted Con-

necticut Yankee with a penchant for map-

making. He asked Hotchkiss to make a

detailed map of the whole valley from Lex-

ington to Harper’s Ferry, which Hotchkiss

then commenced. Hotchkiss drew as much

of the valley as he could, including topog-

raphy, roads, railroads, buildings, rivers,

bridges, and fords. The work of this map-

maker was invaluable to Jackson for the

next six weeks.

On April 17 as the roads were drying,

this is what Jackson faced. His valley army

(in all Jackson commanded about 6,000

men at this time, including Ashby’s cav-

alry) was between Mount Jackson and

New Market. Union Maj. Gen. Nathaniel

Banks’ army of 21,000 was also on the

Valley Pike threatening him from the

north. West of the Shenandoah Valley,

strung out parallel to the upper valley and

with the vanguard under Brig. Gen. Robert

Milroy at McDowell (about 27 miles west

of Staunton) was the 17,000-man army of

Maj. Gen. John Charles Fremont. He was

opposed by 2,500 Confederates under

Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson. If Johnson

were defeated by Fremont, then Fremont

could enter the valley via McDowell and

be in Jackson’s rear. To the east, Union

General Irving McDowell (of First Man-

assas infamy and not to be confused with

the aforementioned town) was at Freder-

icksburg with 30,000 men. Confederate

Maj. Gen. Richard Ewell was just outside

the valley on the eastern side of the Blue

Ridge with 8,500 men. Thus within or

close to the valley were about 68,000 Fed-

erals matched against 17,000 Confeder-

ates. In addition, Union Maj. Gen. George

B. McClellan (a West Point classmate of

Jackson’s who finished far ahead of the

Southerner) was threatening Richmond

with 100,000 men against 50,000 under

Joseph E. Johnston. Robert E. Lee at the

time was in Richmond as a military adviser

to President Jefferson Davis.

If McDowell were to march overland to

Richmond, as was the Federal plan, thus

becoming the right flank of McClellan’s

host, the fate of Richmond was likely

sealed. But Jackson understood that U.S.

President Abraham Lincoln was acutely

sensitive to the defense of Washington,

DC. Should the North’s capital fall to Con-

federate troops, likely the war would be

settled in favor of the South’s secession. If

Jackson did not at first know of Lin-

coln’s—and his Secretary of War, Edwin

Stanton’s—sensitivity to Washington’s

defense, then he learned of it soon enough

after Jackson’s rebuff on March 23 at

Kernstown, which lies on the Valley Pike

just south of Winchester.

At that place, Jackson made a hasty

attack on what he had been told—falsely,

owing to a rare intelligence failure by

Ashby—was a rear guard of Union troops

quitting the valley for McDowell’s com-

mand. Jackson had not confirmed the esti-

mate with his own reconnoitering, and his

men confronted far more than they had

expected. Jackson bloodied the Union

force, but then retreated up the Valley Pike

past Strasburg. The rebuff, however, had

some of the effects of the kind of victory

Jackson coveted because it foiled rein-

forcements moving to McClellan. Lincoln

stopped McDowell’s intended advance to

Richmond so he could thwart any Con-

federate move from the west on Washing-

ABOVE, Left to Right: Nathaniel Banks, Robert Milroy, and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. OPPOSITE:

Union and Confederate forces clashed time after time in the rich agricultural valley, prized by both

sides for its food, livestock, and strategic position.

All National Archives

Jackson was fortunate to have men who not only

loved to ride but who did it very well and, even more

important, knew the valley as well as the backs of

their horses’ heads.

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