ton, and more forces were sent to the val-
ley to deal with Jackson.
Other important lessons were learned at
Kernstown and during the weeks before.
On March 11, Jackson had called a coun-
cil of war in preparation for a night attack
against Banks when that general was
encamped north of Winchester. Jackson’s
subordinates objected vociferously owing
to the fact that many of the men had
marched in the opposite direction to get
rations and they would be exhausted if
forced to Jackson’s intended point of
attack. Jackson was furious. He vowed he
would never again hold a council of war
with subordinates. He was true to his
word and from that time forth he kept his
own counsel, telling practically no one of
his major plans. In addition, if the point
was not already clear, he knew he would
have to make sure of an enemy’s strength
and to exceed it if possible with greater
numbers on his own part.
Deception, secrecy, movement, picking
up disparate commands to strike with
superior numbers: These were the hall-
marks of Jackson’s subsequent campaign
in the valley.
On April 17, Banks moved south. Jack-
son, with less than half the Federal num-
bers, began to withdraw. Banks seized
New Market. Two days later, he sent some
Federal troops over Massanutten Moun-
tain to Luray. If Banks had energy and
dared much, he could push down both val-leys. If he could get down the Luray Val-
ley quickly, he could cut Jackson off from
Ewell and then defeat Jackson on the Val-
ley Pike or in the open ground south of
Harrisonburg. Jackson saw the danger. He
sent his men off in swift marches such that
soon they would be known as Jackson’s
“foot cavalry.” On the 18th they marched
more than 20 miles to Harrisonburg. The
next day they marched around the south-
ern rump of Massanutten Mountain to a
village called Conrad’s Store, 25 miles
south of Luray and near Swift Run Gap, in
case they were pressed to leave the valley.
In three days they had marched 55 miles
and secured their communications with
Ewell. Banks marched down to Harrison-
burg on the 26th.
Jackson’s new location was a safe one.
The Blue Ridge was at his back and he
could make a defense of it; moreover,
Ewell could reinforce him. And he was
checking any move by Banks on
Staunton—through which ran the valley’s
only rail link to Richmond—because he
could attack him in the flank as he
marched. Still, the situation was not much
use to Johnston in Richmond, and
McDowell was again massing forces for a
move on the Confederate capital.
Jackson decided to act. He had Ewell
march with his 8,500 men across Swift
Run Gap to take over the valley army’s
camp sites. Ewell’s orders were to watch
Banks. Ashby, in fact, had been sent overto the Valley Pike to demonstrate against
Banks. But even Ashby did not know Jack-
son’s true intentions. Ewell knew some-
what more, but not much.
On April 30, Jackson, letting no one
know his destination, put his men on a
march southwest to Port Republic. The
weather was awful and the march was
slow. From Port Republic on May 3, Jack-
son turned east toward Brown’s Gap and
marched out of the Shenandoah Valley.
Those who saw the move believed that
Jackson was in retreat and abandoning
Staunton. The soldiers were bewildered; if
they were to help the people in Staunton,
or to wrestle with Banks, they were going
exactly the wrong way. Jackson marched
to Mechum’s River Station on the Virginia
Central Railroad, loaded his men in rail
cars, and had them hauled by rail back
into the valley all the way to Staunton.
On the same day that Jackson moved,
Banks assured Washington that Jackson
had quit the valley and was headed for
Richmond. Lincoln and Stanton took the
opportunity to remove Shields’ division
from Banks and order Banks to retire
toward Strasburg, he being weakened by
the loss of Shields and there not being much
more to do where he was. Shields was to go
to McDowell at Fredericksburg and join in
his overland march on Richmond.
At noon on May 4, men of the valley
army unloaded at the Staunton station.
Staunton citizens—who only hours andQ-Spr16 Shenandoah_Layout 1 1/14/16 12:29 PM Page 82