would stop and try to deal with each sep-
arately. And at Port Republic he also had
an escape route, if need be, out of the val-
ley for the Piedmont.
For several days the valley army
marched south up the Valley Pike. Ashby’s
men harassed and attacked Fremont’s men
to slow their pursuit. In one of these
attack’s Ashby was killed leading a charge.
For all of Jackson’s consternation with his
dashing cavalryman, he sorely missed him.
On June 6 the valley army rounded the
southern end of Massanutten Mountain.
Jackson had Ewell take up a defensive
position just southwest of the hamlet of
Cross Keys and placed the bulk of the rest
of the valley army overlooking Port
Republic. He had won the race with
Shields to this place, but barely—a Federal
force entered on June 8. These Federals
came close to destroying the Port Repub-
lic bridge, which crossed the North River,one of two tributaries to the South Fork
of the Shenandoah. The other tributary
was the South River—Port Republic lies
between the two. South River had no
bridge, only a ford. Had the Federals
destroyed the North River bridge the val-
ley army would have been trapped on the
side of the river with Fremont. As it was,
Jackson had greater freedom of movement
than either Federal army.
About the time that the Federal recon-
naissance was being driven out of Port
Republic on June 8, Fremont’s army of
about 10,000 men attacked Ewell’s 5,000
on a rise outside Cross Keys. Fremont did
not make the best use of his forces, and
Ewell repulsed them without great trou-
ble. Jackson rode up about the time the
fighting was closing. One of Ewell’s
brigadiers, 60-year-old Isaac Trimble, who
had graduated from West Point two years
before Jackson was born, urged Ewell to
charge the Federals. But Ewell declined,
not wishing to spoil whatever Jackson had
in mind for the following day.
Indeed Jackson did have something in
mind, formulated after dark on the 8th.
He meant to have Trimble demonstrate
against the timid Fremont. Ewell mean-
while was to join Jackson’s force west of
Port Republic. Together they would cross
the solitary bridge into town before dawn
and fall upon Shields’ forward elements,
commanded by Brig. Gen. Erastus Tyler of
Ohio. After the Confederates had drubbed
the Federals on this side of the river, they
would recross, join Trimble, and whip Fre-
mont. It was unprecedented audacity.
But the morning proved more difficult
than Jackson had hoped. The Federals
under Tyler were in good position. The
Stonewall Brigade under Winder tried
advancing across wheat fields only to be
cut up by artillery set on a rise at the left
of the Union line. Jackson ordered the Fed-
eral guns flanked and captured. But Con-
federates tasked with the job had to tra-
verse deep forest, and then ran into Federal
infantry protecting the guns. They
attacked but were thrown back.
Meanwhile, reinforcements were slow to
get to the field. There was confusion at thePort Republic bridge, compounded by the
crossing of the South River via an impro-
vised bridge built in the night; it was begin-
ning to crack up. Jackson had no choice
but to throw in more troops as they came
up. He eventually ordered Trimble to Port
Republic, burning the one good bridge
behind him to isolate Fremont, and giving
up his idea of going back for a blow at Fre-
mont’s army.
The key to success in the present fight
outside Port Republic was the clearing in
which the Federals had placed their
artillery. Again and again Confederates
charged, took it, and were forced back.
Ultimately they retained the vital piece of
battlefield and Tyler was beaten. He began
retreating to Conrad’s Store. Fremont,
whom Jackson feared would follow hard
on Trimble and at the least make lots of
trouble in Jackson’s rear during the fight
against Tyler, remained cautious. Later in
the day he began a retreat to Harrisonburg
and then north of New Market.
As for Jackson, he pursued Fremont, but
with less intent to attack than to confuse.
He set out all sorts of intelligence that he
would again pounce on Federals in the val-
ley. And he gave his men a welcomed rest.
They had earned it.
But for Jackson’s dashes and fights
throughout the Shenandoah Valley,
McDowell would likely have marched on
Richmond in May or June 1862, and Rich-
mond might well have fallen. How the
seizure of the Confederate capital in 1862
would have affected the war is anyone’s
guess, but as events unwound, three more
years were needed for the effort. Jackson’s
campaign was successful strategically and
astonishing tactically because Jackson—
with Lee’s support in Richmond—saw the
effort not in lines of battle but in lines of
movement. Moving skillfully, he could
position himself to best advantage and
wield his power most effectively. With
17,000 troops he tied up 50,000 Federals
and confounded the drive on Richmond.
The man sucked on lemons, told no one
of his plans, and passed out religious
leaflets on Sundays, but he had a genius
for getting results.Q-Spr16 Shenandoah_Layout 1 1/14/16 12:29 PM Page 87