rumors blaming a conspiracy, extreme media
amplifying divisive information. Now imagine
combining all three. A not-especially-powerful
technical issue could be amplified into a
significant election disruption.
Q: There are no real federal election security
standards despite expert consensus on
how to make elections less hackable, voter-
verifiable paper ballots for starters. Government
regulation is mostly absent. Is it too late to do
anything for 2020?
A: Election authorities are already readying
the primaries. It is difficult to imagine what we
could do on a federal level to fix these issues at
this point.
Q: Why is your outfit at Stanford prioritizing the
study of disinformation as a threat to democracy?
A: The Russian playbook is not difficult to
implement — and not illegal under many
circumstances. The disinformation market
is thriving. Domestic actors create fake
outlets much as Russian agents did in 2016.
Internationally, companies offer disinformation
as a service. Foreign money cannot fund
domestic electioneering ads. But people whose
Facebook and Twitter accounts are deleted for
terms of service violations can simply create new
accounts and try again.
Q: You worked at Facebook and have a good
idea of how disinformation became a problem.
Facebook can’t seem to get it under control.
Why not?
A: Your assumption that “They can’t control all
this information” is not something I necessarily
agree with.