Before the Race Control email was made public, Libby
Greenhalgh, the navigator, explained what happened:
“The electronic chart was different from the paper charts.
“I’d already put in a three mile buffer for it, but actually it
was quite notably different. We wouldn’t have wanted to go
where we were going. We probably would’ve made it, but...”
Discrepancies between the available data are expected
in these waters. In preparation for into Leg 6 from Hong
Kong to Auckland, Greenhalgh was cross-referencing
C-Map, Navionics and paper charts, and highlighting on
the electronic versions where there was a lack of clarity.
Greenhalgh joined Scallywag straight after the Sydney-
Hobart race and admits that there was a degree to which
any error was down to her joining the boat late. “[There
was] probably a little bit of stepping on the day and a half
before [the start] and not taking the time to go ‘hang on a
minute, what do we know about this kind of stuff?’” Again,
following the Vestas Wind crash in 2014, a lack of
preparation time for navigators was found to be a likely
contributing factor.
The question of whether Race Control should have
emailed the boat is more subjective.
Jules Salter, navigator on AkzoNobel, commented: “I
think it’s a very dangerous thing to do, sort of dumbing
down what we do on board. In this race supposedly
everyone on board is meant to have a Yachtmaster
qualification, it kind of demeans the qualification.
“To me it’s setting a very bad precedent because anyone
now who smacks into a reef [are] going to go, well, why
didn’t Race Control tell us? On the other hand, you would
want to be told if you were going to put your vessel in
danger, so there are two sides to it.”
Race director Phil Lawrence confirmed that the email
did not result in a breach of rule 41 (outside assistance), as
‘the information was not requested by SHK Scallywag so it
was unsolicited information’.Self-protection
Safety is taken hugely seriously in the Volvo Ocean Race.
The sailing protocols require that instructions are
displayed on board and all crew are fully trained in what to
do in the event of a ‘man overboard, fire, recovery from
capsize, collision/flooding response, chain of command,
response to piracy attack, helicopter transfer, boat
transfer, abandonment of the vessel’. How many yachts –
or events – could honestly say they demand the same
level of preparedness?
Race organisers already effectively guard against
competitive sailors’ instincts, for example the much
maligned ice gates, which prevent skippers from heading
dangerously far south. If organisers were to enforce
stricter MOB rules and safety check navigation decisions
with yachts as standard practice, the Volvo Ocean Race
would be a very different event.
But there have been previous occasions when skippers
have felt that a race area is not safe – as with the Malacca
Strait. In the current race many have voiced concerns
about the time demands on the sailors during stopovers,
and if they feel they do not have the time to adequately
prepare for ocean legs, then those concerns need to
be addressed.
If the Volvo Ocean Race continues to evolve to feature
faster, foil-assisted yachts, sailed by fewer, often less
experienced crew, balancing those risks will only become
ever more critical.No official
findings after
the Vestas 11th
Hour Racing
fatal collision
have yet been
releasedThe race
tracker showing
Scallywag’s
change of course
to divert around
Nereus Reef‘a lot of things aren’t lit,
and aren’t on AIS’
Team Scallywag doubled back on their track to avoid a
reef. So far, so uneventful.
Only after the boats had arrived in Hong Kong did it
transpire that Race Control, the organisers’ monitoring
and commentary team that has full access to all yachts’
tracking data, had become concerned by Scallywag’s
heading. Rick Tomlinson, who was on duty in Race Control
that day, sent the boat the following email:
“Hi Libby/Dave: just so I can relax a bit here in Race
Control, tell me you are happy with your course in
relation to Nereus Reef on Landsdowne Bank. The
Australian Charts have the Reef extending to 160° 35’E,
which is further east than the C-Map charts show.”
The revelation raised some key questions: first, whether
the C-Map chart data was sufficiently accurate (something
which had been raised during the investigation into the
Vestas Wind crash in the last race)? Secondly, whether this
was prudent of the race organisers, or did it count as
outside assistance?