question tradition and occasionally revise beliefs we learned, there are more
general and automatic strategies in place to optimize learning: we tend to
follow individuals whom we perceive as successful and we do what the
majority of people do around us (Richerson & Boyd, 2005, pp. 162–4; see
section 8.5).
Even if we are not able to validate the truth content of a piece of culturally
acquired information, however, its actual content matters for its cultural
success. When inquiring about the cultural success of miracle stories, one of
the most important cognitive factors is their counterintuitive character. We
have already discussed the meaning of counterintuitiveness in the Cognitive
Science of Religion (in sections 2.2.4 and 4.7), and a brief summary of the
concept will suffice here. Maturationally natural ontology develops in children
consistently under a wide range of external circumstances and enables people
to respond to information in the environment quickly and efficiently. For
example, we know that animals move, humans speak, and tools are designed
for some purpose and we can interact with them accordingly, without testing
those features in every instance of them. It has been demonstrated that ideas
including a limited amount of details that violate innate ontological categories
are remembered better and therefore have an advantage in cultural transmis-
sion. For example, a donkey that talks (e.g.,Acts of Thomas 39 – 41 and 68–81)
or a statue that hears what people speak violates expectations about animals
and artifacts, respectively. Such minimally counterintuitive ideas are remem-
bered and passed on at higher rates than either ordinary or maximally
counterintuitive items.
In some miracles, identifying the counterintuitive element is rather straight-
forward. For example, the multiplication of bread in Mark 6.39–44 and
parallels violates maturationally natural expectations about artifacts. We do
not expect natural objects or artifacts (such as bread) to multiply spontan-
eously, which we only attribute to living things. Another food miracle, the
changing of water into wine (John 2:2–11), also implies a crossing of onto-
logical boundaries. Whereas water is a natural substance, wine is an artifact.
Arguably, we do not expect natural objects to transform into artifacts without
human labor: artifacts are produced by investing time and energy. Miracles
about resurrecting dead people (2 Kgs. 4:32–35, 13:20–21; Mk 5:21–43 and
parallels; Luke 7:11–15; John 11:1–44; Acts 20:9–12) are strictly counterintui-
tive. Dead bodies and decomposing corpses (John 11.38–44) are not expected
to resume biological function. In theActs of Peter, the apostle brings a smoked
tunnyfish back to life in (ch. 13, cf. Herodotus 9.120.1) and later resurrects a
young boy (ch. 28). The boundary between objects (or tools) and animals is
crossed in the Arabic Infancy Gospel 36, where the child Jesus models animals
from clay and makes them behave (run,fly, eat) like real animals.
Many other miracles, however, lack a strictly counterintuitive element. For
example, catching extraordinary amounts offish (Luke 5:1–11) at an unusual
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