When reasoning about the connection between religion and morality, Boyer
did not invoke morally interested gods or rituals as the foundation of human
cooperative behavior. Our cognitive modules and emotions specialized in
social interaction are sufficient to make us (reasonably) moral beings. Ideas
of moral gods are interesting and relevant because theyfit in excellently with
our social instincts: we expect the gods to know all morally relevant informa-
tion and have a clear opinion on situations of which they have full knowledge—in
fact, however, we use our own moral intuitions to build a mental construct of
the gods’moral judgment. The view that God monitors people’s morally
relevant thoughts and feelings is reflected in many biblical passages. God
examines people’s“kidneys”and sees their evil or good plans (e.g., Pss. 7:9,
51:6; Jer. 17:10; Rev. 2:23). Such references seem to confirm the traditional
religious argument that the fear of God is the foundation of morality. Indeed,
some recent work on the connection between religion and morality considered
such a view of the divine as the main contribution of religion to human
evolution. In addition to enabling cooperation with strangers and thus facili-
tating the formation of large, anonymous social groups (see section 8.3), the
religious fear of divine retribution is thought to be adaptive as it prevents the
individual from getting into potentially deadly conflicts with the group
(Johnson, 2015).
Above in our discussion of empathy (section 8.1) we have already men-
tioned the problem of dealing with different people in different ways: we
adjust our use of empathy based on whom we are dealing with. It is most
interesting, however, that we can also deal with the very same person differ-
ently in different contexts. Suppose you meet an old friend after some years
and it turns out he joined an aggressively evangelizing religious group in the
meantime. What shall you make of his words and behavior? Is it the friend
who speaks or the zealot? Or imagine a young child who goes to the same
school at which her father or mother works as a teacher.“Why does she talk to
me like that?”wonders the child.“Is she not my mother anymore?”Of course
the child will soon learn that mom has to talk differently to her as a teacher
than as a mother. But the ambiguity still remains at the level of intuitions.
Similar situations are a frequent theme of literature: families, friends, and
loversfind themselves on opposite sides of family feuds, wars, or institutional
hierarchies. Most importantly, dealing with the same individual as a friend,
family member, or rival, is not merely a question of employing different
degrees of empathy: each of these scenarios will require the use of a different
set of social interactive tools and strategies. According to developmental
psychologist Judith Harris, evolution equipped us with multiple systems to
take care of social interaction (Harris, 2007). (1) First, ourrelationship system
handles our social interaction with single individuals. The purpose of this
system is to establish and maintain favorable relationships. (2) Second, our
socialization systemhandles information about groups. During development,
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