These questions can be answered in many different ways and it is not the task
of this chapter to deal with these issues at great depth. However, we have to
consider some of the basic issues at this place because they will be relevant for
later discussions of cognitive theories in this book. The idea that there exists
any relationship between the brain and thinking is not at all intuitive. For
example, Aristotle located the seat of cognitive processes in the heart, assign-
ing to the brain the function of a radiator (Gross, 1995). We can also take
reincarnation as an example: for reincarnation to work, memories of an earlier
life have to be transferred to a new body (through a non-material channel),
which excludes that one’s memories are tied to the brain.
The theory of mind/brain identity has been developed through several
stages in the modern philosophy of mind. In this context, mind/brain identity
means that “states and processes of the mind are identical to states and
processes of the brain”(Smart, 2014). That is, we do not claim that brain
and mind are identical so that we could speak, for example, of the weight of the
mind being equal to the weight of the brain. Ullin Place (1954) suggested
that the sensations are brain processes. Later versions of the identity theory
developed and partly modified Place’s ideas, arguing that the brain causes
mental states or that mental states are functions of the brain (Smart, 2014).
According to the functionalist theory, mental states are linked to some brain
states, but it cannot be said with certainty if the same sensation (such as
toothache) is always connected to the exact same brain state. Finally, the type
and token theories apply a building-block approach. In information theory
and linguistics, an occurrence of a word (such as a mention of“bird”)isa
token, whereas the word independently of its concrete occurrences (the word
“bird”) is a type. Type and token theories of mind/brain identity claim that
brain states are similar to words as types, from which mental states are built
like sentences.
One does not have to believe in incarnation or lack biological knowledge to
have doubts about the identity theory. In section 1.1 above we already
mentioned the argument that if the mind could be realized in a computer
model (or some other medium), the identity of brain and mind would be
called into question. We also discussed a variety of theories that extend the
boundaries of the mind beyond the brain. These theories claim that when we
perform cognition we rely on external memory stores, other people’s cogni-
tion, our body and its environment, or combinations of such elements. Let us
note, however, that none of these alternative hypotheses implies that we
should not study the anatomy and functioning of the brain to learn more
about cognition. If the mind can be realized in some other medium, our
knowledge of the human mind is still helped by studying the medium in
which our minds are realized normally. Adding various external components
to the brain to perform cognition still does not mean that studying the role of
the brain in this larger complex would not be important. Indeed, unless we
50 Cognitive Science and the New Testament