Patanjali tells us that it does not mean that the mind which is aware of an object
creates the object. The object is not manufactured or produced by the mind; it is only
aware of the presence of the object in a particular manner, and the manner has been
described. What is the manner in which the object makes an impression upon the
mind? Here is a great point in philosophy—namely, the relationship of the object to
the mind, and vice versa. Entire schools of philosophical thought may be said to be
labouring on the solution of this one question: what is the relation of the mind to the
object, or the relation of the object to the mind? Who is the determining factor of
what? Does the mind passively receive any impression that is made upon it by the
object, and the mind has nothing to contribute to the nature of the object? Is it only a
featureless and passive receiver of the impressions made upon it by the object? Is it
the case? Or is it true that the mind has something to contribute to the nature of the
object, so that we may be right in holding that in the perception of an object, the
character of the mind influences the object, and the object as it is in itself is never
cognised?
These two theories, technically called the theories of realism and idealism in
philosophy, are opposite schools of thought. One holds the independent existence of
the objects outside, making the mind only subservient as a percipient; the other
holds that the objects are subservient and the mind is the superior controller and
determiner. We cannot take any of these two sides, because they are only partial
expressions of a transcendent position which the objects and the minds occupy in the
structure of nature. It is not true that the mind entirely and wholly determines the
character of the object, so that the object is whatever the mind thinks. Nor is it true
that the mind is a passive receiver of the impressions from the object. The mind has
something to do with the object in the nature of cognition, and that is the reason why
minds have different feelings and reactions in respect of the same object. But if, on
the other hand, the objects were entirely determined by the mind, we would be the
manufacturers of various objects, and whatever we think would crop up in our
presence.
The difficulty is that which subsists between the relation of the individual to the
cosmic. What is the connection between the individual and the universal? This
question, if it is answered, will also answer the question of the relation between the
mind and the object. Here we have a judgement passed on the quarrel between the
realistic doctrines and the idealistic theories. The whole problem arises on account of
an inability of the individual minds to comprehend the cosmic relationship that
seems to be there behind them, notwithstanding that they are individual perceivers.
The relationship between the mind and the object is twofold. It is empirical as well as
transcendental, and we should not mix up one with the other. The difficulty arises on
account of a mixing up of these two levels of perception. The object, as well as the
mind that cognises the object, has an empirical feature, or a form and a relation, and
also a transcendental location. It is the transcendental status that the minds and the
objects occupy in the scheme of things that sometimes makes it appear that the
objects are idealistically located and determined by the percipients. But there is also
an empirical realm, the realm of ordinary perception where the objects do not seem
to be entirely under the control of the minds. They stand outside the minds and,
therefore, it is not possible to deduce that they are entirely determined in the process
of cognition.