Chapter 64DISENTANGLEMENT IS FREEDOMWhat is attempted through the practice of yoga is to gain an insight into the
misconception that has arisen on account of an admixture of characters which
belong, on the one hand, to the principle that is responsible for seeing, and on the
other hand, to the principle that is responsible for anything being seen. How is it that
something is seen? And, how is it that something sees? The character of seeing is
different from the character of being seen. One is called drasta; the other is called
drishya. Draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ saṁyogaḥ heyahetuḥ (II.17) is the sutra. But for common
understanding, no such difficulty seems to arise because everything is clear. “I am
seeing things,” is a very glib statement that one can make in respect of the perceptual
experience. The feeling ‘I see an object’ is not a simple phenomenon; it is a
tremendously complex arrangement of various features which constitute an
apparently single compound of an experience of ‘I-ness’ in respect of the
phenomenon of perception. Even the very consciousness of ‘I’ in this process of
perceiving an object is an effect produced by a confusion, as has been pointed out in
our earlier studies, and is designated by the term ‘asmita’ in the sutra of Patanjali.
It is impossible to have consciousness of an object unless one has made oneself
susceptible, in the very beginning itself, to the process called perception. It is
necessary that the perceiving subject should have the characteristics necessary for
the process of perception. That which is perceived is an object, and the subject which
perceives the object should have sympathetic characters, not dissimilar ones. On par
should be placed the subject as well as the object. If the object is phenomenal, the
subject that perceives the object also should be equally phenomenal. A super-spatial
and super-temporal subject cannot perceive a spatial and temporal object. That
which is metempirical cannot be the subjective consciousness which perceives an
empirical object. There should be a concourse between the seeing and the seen
principles, by means of features which are common to both. Both should be in space,
and both should be in time; that is one condition. Secondly, the abstraction of a
particular point in consciousness, which goes by the name of individuality, is
essential prior to the attempt at perceiving an object. In other words, we have to be
conscious of our existence first, in order that we may be able to be conscious of an
object outside.
First of all, we are aware that we exist; and then everything follows, as the case may
be. We have inwardly a conviction of our being something endowed with certain
special attributes. Even when we get up in the morning after being fast asleep, the
first experience would be a sensation of being, and not sensation of the world
outside, which comes later on. There is a faint feeling of one’s existence, and then a
more distinct feeling of one’s existence as a special entity—a particular something.
Sometimes when we get up from deep sleep, we do not know where we are—in which
place we went to sleep. To find out where we have slept requires a few seconds—“Oh,
I am in such and such place.” Sometimes we forget the direction. We do not know
where the door is. We go and hit ourselves against the wall, thinking it is the door, if
we are fast asleep. There are people who forget the locations, directions—
everything—and it takes a few minutes to know where they have slept.