that Nicias’argument is not appropriate in a“gathering like this”and his concern for what is
appropriate and inappropriate differentiates Laches from Nicias (196b). Nicias’problematic view
of knowledge is not simply a consequence of his concern with politics. Nicias’inability to
recognize what is and what is not appropriate suggests that his own understanding is informed by an
incorrect understanding of knowledge. Thus, in exposing Nicias’lack of harmony Socrates must
argue for an alternative understanding of knowledge and this argument is made on three levels.
On the first level, connecting Nicias with seers reminds the reader of Nicias’reputation for being
superstitious.^44 Calling on the reader to make this connection raises questions regarding the appro-
priateness of Nicias’knowledge for the good of the city. The text clarifies this concern by connecting
Nicias with the sophists which serves as the second level of argument. Whereas Socrates had pre-
viously suggested a connection between the sophists and both Laches and Nicias, it is Laches who
developsthisargumentfurtherwhenhechargesNiciasofrefusingtoadmit,asagentlemanwould,that
he is“talking nonsense”(186a–b, 196a). Instead, Nicias“twists this way and that in an attempt to
cover up this difficulty”and, hopefully, achieve victory and avoid embarrassing himself (196b).
SocratesultimatelyendorsesthischargewhenheidentifiesthesourceofNicias’wisdomasthesophist
Prodicus (197d). WhereasLaches will claim that the knowledgeofthe sophistsis not fit for“a man the
city thinks worthy to be its leader,”it remains for Socrates to explain why this is the case (197d).
This argument is provided on the third level. Nicias comes to define courage as knowledge of
future anticipated evils (198c). While his exclusive concern with future evils reinforces his con-
nection to seers, the larger point Socrates makes concerns the nature of knowledge itself. Socrates
tells Nicias that“there is not one kind of knowledge by which we know things that have happened in
the past, and another by which we know how things are happening in the present, and still another
by which we know what has not yet happened might best come to be in the future, but that the
knowledge is the same in each case”(198d). Nicias’exclusive concern with future events and his
superstition prevent him from recognizing the true nature of knowledge. Nicias is only able to
identify about one-third of courage because he fails to understand that courage“understands not
simply future goods and evils, but those of the present and past and all times, just as with other kinds
of knowledge”(199b–c). This, in turn, explains Nicias’dubious decision in Sicily not to take
advantage of the lunar eclipse and escape under the cloak of darkness.^45 In recognition of this,
Socrates tells Nicias that one who possesses knowledge does not consider it necessary
to be ruled by the art of the seer, but to rule it, as being better acquainted with both present and
future in the affairs of war. In fact, the law decrees, not that the seer should command the
general, but that the general should command the seer (199a).Thus, Nicias’lack of knowledge not only prevents him from defining courage, it causes him to
undermine the laws of the city and, consequently, the city itself.
Why this is the case is revealed when one compares the responses of Laches and Nicias upon
learning of their lack of harmony. Recall that Laches recognizes his own lack of harmony and that
he is willing to continue the investigation into the nature of courage (193e). Whereas he does so for
political reasons (victory) and out of anger, he continues to hold himself and his opinions up for
examination (194a). In contrast, Nicias does not feel any shame. Whereas Laches feels anger
toward himself due to his inability to“express what I think in this fashion,”Nicias lashes out at his
fellow interlocutor which effectively brings the conversation to a close (194b, 200a–b). Whereas
both Laches and Nicias decide to abandon the conversation and both recommend that Socrates
continue to consult with Lysimachus and Melesias on the education of their sons, where they go is
important (200c–d). Given his previous attempts to leave the conversation, Laches presumably
returns to attending to the affairs of the city. Nicias, in contrast, will first consult with Damon and
“once secure on these points,”will be able to“instruct you [Laches] too and won’t begrudge the
effort–because you seem to me to be sadly in need of learning”(200b–c).
The Courage of the Socratic Method 103