proper conditions for a fruitful Socratic conversation and to help students understand the benefits
of such conversation.
The“Philosophic Imperialism”Critique
Thus far, I have adopted a view of“culture”centered on horizons or constellations of beliefs,
habits, and languages roughly corresponding with particular peoples. It is also possible, how-
ever, to critique the Socratic method on the grounds that it attempts to convert participants
to what one might call“philosophic”culture. Similar to the normative imperialism critique,
this critique charges Socratic teachers with manipulating students into conforming to a par-
ticular way of life–although, in this case, these values are not so much“Greek”or“Western”
as philosophic. That is, whereas Socratic education may significantlycall into question the
values of any existing culture, it is nevertheless imperialistic, according to this critique, in that it
tries to impose the values of an“otherworldly”philosophic culture. Put simply, Socrates has in
mind what a virtuous person looks like; he may pretend as though he does not know what virtue
is and as though he and his interlocutors are equals in the dialog taking place, but in actuality
he is a cunning manipulator coercing them intoaccepting predetermined answers about the
good life.
To my mind, two substantial responses can be given to this critique. First, as theRepublicshows,
the final power always rests with Socrates’interlocutors. Cephalus is not persuaded by Socrates’
refutation of his notion of justice, and he excuses himself from the conversation with no objection
on Socrates’part. Admittedly, participation in Socratic conversation may not be so voluntary in
contemporary classrooms where students’grades depend on it, but this suggests students can“take
or leave”the revelations of the conversation. This point is well illustrated throughout Plato’s
dialogs. Though some of Socrates’interlocutors amount to little more than“yes men,”interlocutors
like Thrasymachus or Callicles from theGorgiasexhibit substantial resistance to assenting to the
conclusions to which theelenchusdraws them. Furthermore, even more acquiescent interlocutors
often give the impression of not having been fully“converted”by Socrates’arguments. After all, in
theRepublic, Socrates raises serious questions about the notion of justice as doing good to one’s
friends and harm to one’s enemies, yet this conception of justice later becomes foundational to the
city in speech without so much as a reminder from his interlocutors of the potential problems with it.
This suggests that Socrates’refutation of this definition of justice was not as effective as it initially
seemed. In other words, even if Socratic teachers aim to convert their students to the philosophic
way of life, their ability to do so is limited. Only teachings that truly resonate with the soul can have
the desired effect.
Second, there is substantial evidence that when Plato’s Socrates claims not to know the answers
to the questions he raises, he is telling the truth. To be sure, he makes clear that he holds particular
“opinions”about questions such as what the Good is, and that he sees his opinions on some matters
as more advanced than those of his interlocutors (Republic, 506e). Using these insights, he tries to
guide his interlocutors toward the opinions he holds. At the same time, the dialogs repeatedly stress
the importance of submitting to examination even the ideas of which one is most sure.^26 As
Bickford explains, for Plato the claims arrived at through dialectic“are only as strong as continued
argumentation makes them:::. Socrates must at once get his interlocutors to question their own
knowingness, while at the same time urging them to question his own.”^27 A good Socratic teacher
does not remain content, then, with leading her students toward the truths her own investigations
have uncovered. Rather, a good Socratic teacher will push further, encouraging the students to
examine even these opinions. This is perhaps why so often Socrates’inquiries end inaporia.Itis
also perhaps why Plato himself wrote dialogs rather than treatises, for dialogs reproduce the
Socratic pedagogical practice of inducing perplexity by leaving ideas open to discussion instead of
unambiguously advocating a particular set of beliefs.^28
Is Socrates Culturally Imperialistic? 133