a man’s virtue consists in being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his
friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; [:::] the virtue
of a woman [:::] [is to] manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and to be submissive
to her husband; the virtue of the child [:::] is different again, and so is that of an elderly man,
[:::] [and] that of a free man or a slave. And there are many other virtues (71e–72a).Socrates does not accept Meno’s first attempt to say what virtue is, but proceeds to refute his
definition. Yet, in his refutation, Socrates does not take issue with the content of Meno’s definition.
For instance, Meno says that part of man’s virtue is helping friends and harming enemies. In other
dialogs justice has been defined or understood in similar terms. In theRepublic, Polemarchus
defines justice as helpingfriends and harming enemies, and in theCrito,Critounderstands justice in
a similar way. Yet, in these dialogs Socrates refutes his interlocutors by taking issue with the content
of this understanding: he argues to Polemarchus that harm makes the true enemy worse but justice
cannot make a person worse in the sense of more unjust, so a just man harms no one, and similarly,
to Crito he argues that it is always wrong to return a harm for a harm.^9 Yet, in theMeno, Socrates
takes issue not with the content of Meno’s definition of virtue, but rather with its form or structure.
Thus, Socrates asks:
Meno, [:::] on the image of swarms, if I were asking you what is the nature of bees, and you
said that they are many and of all kinds, what would you answer if I asked you:“Do you mean
that they are many and varied and different from one another insofar as they are bees? Or are
they no different in that regard, but in some other respect, in their beauty, for example, or their
size or in some other such way?”Tell me, what would you answer if thus questioned?
(Meno): I would say that they do not differ from one another in being bees (72b).
The issue that Socrates has raised with this question is the distinction between the“nature”of
something and its various kinds or particular manifestations. For example, with respect to the
bee, there is the“nature”or species characteristics of the bee–that quality of“beeness,”as it
were–and particular kinds of bees, such as bumble bees, hornets, and wasps. Socrates
continues and asks Meno: If I went on to say:“Tell me what is this very thing, Meno, in which
they are all the same and do not differ from one another?”Would you be able to tell me?
(Meno): I would. The same is true in the case of the virtues. Even if they are many and various,
all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this
when one is asked to make clear what virtue is (72c–d).Socrates thus clarifies to Meno that as he should tell him what the nature or“form”of bee is when he
asks“What is a bee?,”so Meno should tell him what the nature or form of virtue is when he asks
“What is virtue?”The form or nature of a thing is that which makes the many particular examples of
a thing the same rather than different; it is the universal or common characteristics that they share,
and thus makes them what they are.
For instance, with respect to bee, there are bumble bees, hornets, and wasps, but the universal
characteristics that these particular bees share, or that quality of“beeness”that makes them all
bees–they all have wings, can buzz, and sting–is their nature or form. With respect to virtue, there
may be man’s virtue, woman’s virtue, children’s virtue, and the virtues of freemen and slaves, but
what Socrates wants to know is the universal characteristic that all these particular examples of
virtue share that make them virtues. This universal characteristic or quality of virtue, is its nature, or
form. Thus, Socrates clarifies that when he asks“What is virtue?”he does not want Meno to give him
many particular examples of it, but the universal characteristic, or characteristics that all the particular
examples share. In asking for the universal characteristic that all the particular examples share,
50 Ann Ward