NEITHER RIGOROUS NOR OBJECTIVE? 87dictionary.reference.com on December 16, 2004). What interpretive research does is not sampling in the
sense that researchers make no claim for statistically scientific estimation, and its usage in an interpretive
context glosses this distinction, as well as the ways in which “representativeness” means different things in
these different contexts. As my coeditor notes, many qualitative and interpretive researchers “will use phrases
like snowball sampling or purposive sampling (say, across organizational divisions) without necessarily
claiming ‘representativeness’ in the traditional statistical sense—though they might claim an enhanced
validity, say, in that second example” (personal communication, December 17, 2004). Although I agree
with this observation, in keeping with my broad concern for more reflexivity concerning interpretive
methods, I would like to see researchers engage this question of representativeness more explicitly, rather
than using the word rhetorically to make scientific claims.
- Locke, Golden-Biddle, and Feldman (2004) use the vivid example of seeing a sculpture in a museum,
where the viewer walks around and around, and around again, studying the piece from various angles. - The divergences between the researcher’s and others’ responses themselves, however, could well be
data for analysis. Behar (1993) provides an example of a different sort, in which one “ordinary” (i.e., not
elite) individual’s life is the subject of analysis; but here, that personal narrative is presented as an example
of methodological co-construction of family and communal events and experiences, and used as a lens
through which to explore them. In drawing on personal experience, interpretive researchers are (or should
be) acutely aware of the ways in which present experience is shaped by prior experience and traits that are
not necessarily universalizable. - Some forms of action research might be seen as requiring the researcher to “go native” in an identi-
fication with the actors in the situation under analysis. As practiced in some areas of political science (nota-
bly public policy analysis), in sociology, and in organizational studies, it appears to move close enough to
advocacy that some challenge its standing as science altogether. I do not have space here to give this the
attention it deserves. - The Geertzian terminology for emic-etic distinctions—experience-near, experience-distant (Geertz
1973)—draws on this intermingling of ideas concerning physical-spatial and cognitive-emotional proximities.
Knowing-understanding is a matter of experiential proximity; and different physical distances lead to differ-
ent qualities of experience. - As Lipsky (1980) noted with respect to street-level bureaucrats, academics—field researchers in
particular—work out of the range of direct supervision. This does not mean there are not controls, however.
It just moves the controls from directly hierarchical ones to more indirect, professional associational ones.
That does not mean that the controls are any less powerful, however.
The downside of such controls, as Kuhn (1970) noted, is that this leads to theoretical and intellectual
conservatism that dampens the introduction of new ways of thinking. This is why, as he also notes, inno-
vative ideas are more likely to come from newer members of the scientific communities and from others
on their margins. - This is the institutionalization process P. Berger and Luckmann (1966) describe in part II. There is a
wonderful story about how U.S. railroads achieved a “universal” spacing between the rails, that traces its
origins back through English carriages to Roman caissons and the distance between the two horses pulling
them. For related discussions, see Scott (1998). - Bevir (1999) comes close to arguing for such a subjective definition of objectivity. In his view,
objectivity rests on a theory’s grounding in pure (unmediated) experience, which is to say on pure facts. But
rejecting the possibility of pure experience leaves certainty (knowledge, truth) grounded in subjectivity
“because our observations do not record reality neutrally but rather make sense of reality through a theoreti-
cal understanding, therefore, our knowledge must depend at least in part on us. Because experience contains
human elements, knowledge must contain human elements, and because we cannot eradicate these human
elements, objectivity must be a product of our behaviour, not just our experiences. We must portray objectiv-
ity as a product of a human practice” (Bevir 1999, 97). To the extent that theoretical understanding is a
property of a scientific or epistemic community, the subjectivity is collective: an intersubjectivity. “Objectiv-
ity,” in other words, is a property of a community of interpretation and practice. - This is one of the arguments against doing “undercover” or disguised research, which introduces
deceptive practices into an implicitly honest and above-board relationship. - Unlike M. Jourdain in Molière’s play, Le bourgeois gentilhomme, who discovered that he had been
speaking prose all along. In organizational studies, however, as analytic terms from organizational culture
came into wider and wider circulation and currency, executives and managers did begin to speak of rituals,
ceremonies, symbols, metaphors, and the like and to institute them in their organizations.