INTRODUCTION xxvii“some training in both formal theory and quantitative analysis” (http://eitm/berkeley.edu). According to that
same Web site (last accessed June 2, 2005), “researchers use recent advances in game theory and mathemati-
cal modeling to develop theoretical models... [and then these models] are subjected to the highest standards
of [methodologically positivist] empirical research, including statistical analysis, experiments, and case
studies.”
Despite, or perhaps because of, these efforts, lingering tensions between these scholars were apparent in
an extended discussion on the moderated Listserv of the Political Methodology Organized Section of the
American Political Science Association. The thread began with a Thursday, March 24, 2005, post with the
subject line “H-POLMETH: AJPS Rejection Without Review for Theory Papers.” That initial post revealed
that one journal appeared to have adopted a policy of not sending out for review purely theoretical articles
(i.e., formal models without “empirical,” meaning “quantitative,” evidence). Some researchers (e.g., Ander-
son and Simmons 1993) have used field evidence in their tests of the “commons tragedy” model, although
the best evidence within the modeling community is still conceived of as quantitative in form.
- By this logic, then, interpretive researchers support efforts to introduce new numerical indices or
reconceptualize old ones. For example, scholars advocating for the use of “social indicators” (e.g., T. Atkinson
et al. 2002) aim to direct attention to collective matters that are ignored by the gross domestic product (GDP)
indicator, such as the unpaid work most often done by women that does not appear in the GDP. - We understand that the meaning of “advanced” in this context can be interpreted in a number of ways.
For some it is about being more complicated; for others, advanced methods are those that build on methods
developed earlier. For example, analysis of variance builds on difference of means (or t-) tests; logistic and
log-linear regression build on or adapt ordinary least squares regression to address various “data problems”
such as a dichotomous dependent variable, non-linearity, or variables that are all categorical. - For additional analytical techniques beyond those mentioned here and in part III, see Creswell (1998a,
- and P.V. Malone and Chenail (2001, 58).
- At the philosophical level, critical theorists accused phenomenologists of ignoring the power dimen-
sions of lived experience, in choosing to focus on individual consciousness alone and its capacity for change.
As noted in chapter 1, this preoccupation with self to the exclusion of institutions tends to be mitigated when
philosophical argumentations are brought into “applied” contexts of organizations, polities, communities,
and the like, in which power is harder to avoid. - Additionally, this emphasis further contributes to undermining the pernicious fact/value dichotomy.
Theorists such as Taylor (1967) and Rein (1976) have contested this ground for some time, but the message
has penetrated self-consciously “empirical” fields in an uneven manner. For example, in the graduate cur-
ricula of many political science programs, students majoring in the “empirical fields” are often treated differ-
ently from those majoring in “political theory.” This distinctive treatment reflects a conception of “empirical
research” as dealing primarily with “facts,” i.e., so-called positive analysis, and of “political theory” as
dealing primarily with “normative” issues (values). See the discussion in Schwartz-Shea (2005). - As a general observation, we believe this characterization to be accurate, based on our years of
participant-observation in the discipline of political science. That said, there are clear exceptions. A veri-
table cottage industry of critique followed the publication of King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994) method-
ological text (e.g., Review Symposium 1995). Similarly, Ragin (2000a) has argued that the statistical,
regression-based understandings of causality are ontologically implausible. See also chapter 2 of Wendt’s
(1999) discussion. - The “duck-rabbit” is a figure used by Wittgenstein to illustrate the concept of “seeing as.” It origi-
nated in the work of psychologist Joseph Jastrow. See, for example, http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/
JastrowDuck.htm (last accessed May 20, 2005).