HOW NARRATIVES EXPLAIN 283
PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD
Perhaps we might begin by asking what is meant by an interpretive approach. Presumably we
could describe the accounts natural science provides of physical stuff as interpretations. Yet
whereas accounts of physical stuff are interpretations, accounts of actions can be interpreta-
tions of interpretations. Whenever we interpret an action by describing the beliefs of the actor,
we interpret the actor’s interpretation of the world, for their beliefs are, of course, an interpre-
tation of the world. The distinctive nature of interpretive approaches typically derives from
such an analysis of the human sciences as being about interpretations of interpretations.
Interpretivists concentrate on elucidating the meanings—the beliefs and traditions—that are
embedded in actions and practices.
Interpretivism rests, in this view, on a philosophical analysis of the meaningful nature of hu-
man action. Later, I will consider how this analysis inspires a narrative form of explanation. For
now, I want to emphasize the gap between a philosophical analysis of this sort and commitment
to any particular method. To argue that the human sciences offer interpretations of interpretations
is not to imply that particular methods are the only, or best, ones by which so to do. On the
contrary, interpretivists can devise their interpretations of interpretations by drawing eclectically
on data and heuristics associated with all kinds of methods. They can use participant-observation,
questionnaires, interviews, mass surveys, statistical tests, and models, as well as read memoirs,
newspapers, and official and unofficial documents. Interpretivism rests on a philosophical analy-
sis of action as meaningful, and this analysis does not prescribe any particular heuristic or any
method of creating data; rather, it prescribes a particular way of recounting data and theories that
might be generated using any of a variety of methods and heuristics. Interpretivists believe that
human scientists should recount data and theories in narratives that accord with a philosophical
analysis of the human sciences as being about interpreting interpretations.
Although interpretivism rests on philosophical analysis rather than adherence to a particular
methodological tool kit, it does perhaps lend an especial importance to methods traditionally
known as qualitative. Interpretivists seek to recover the beliefs or meanings that make actions and
practices possible: Although different methods might generate relevant data, the data should be
taken as evidence of such beliefs and meanings. Suppose that data and heuristic insights pro-
vided by formal constitutions, large-scale surveys, or models lead us to ascribe a web of beliefs
to people. Insofar as the creation of such data typically abstracts from individual circumstances
to find common patterns, it risks eliding differences between people, even lumping together
people who act in broadly similar ways for entirely different reasons. Surely, therefore, we will
make the most of any opportunity we might have to undertake more detailed studies of the
beliefs of the relevant people by means of textual studies, participant-observation, or in-depth
interviews. Much contemporary political science seems, in contrast, to denigrate textual stud-
ies and ethnography in favor of abstract models, typologies, and correlations. So, although
interpretivism does not require an exclusive use of any one type of data or method, it does help
to redress the balance in favor of studies of a kind more often associated with anthropology and
history than with political science.
The distinctiveness of interpretive approaches derives from a philosophical analysis of the
human sciences. The crux of this analysis is the need to treat data as evidence of beliefs or mean-
ings. Of course, interpretivists are far from being alone in paying such attention to beliefs or
meanings. What makes them more distinctive is their widespread belief that the human sciences
are about beliefs or meanings, as we might say, all the way down. Interpretivists account for