HOW BUILT SPACES MEAN 365sensible appearance... under a representation whose status is unremittingly mental” finds parallel in T.
Mitchell’s (1991) arguments about representation and objectivity; see discussion below.
- Edward Soja similarly notes the void of space, so to speak, in social theorizing, especially of a critical
theoretical sort. He locates this spacelessness in an “essentially historical epistemology” (1989, 10) that
emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century with the universalizing impulse of Marx’s and later
Marxist arguments for the internationale, which subordinated space to time, “occlud[ing] a comparable
critical sensibility to the spatiality of social life” (1989, 11). - I am eliding here a philosophical distinction made by some, although not always unambiguously,
between space and place (see, e.g., Casey 1993). The “place” literature appears, on the whole, to focus on the
phenomenological experience of “being somewhere” that space-contexts can create (see, e.g., Hiss 1990).
This literature appears to treat “space” as an amorphous, generic, neutral entity. As my discussion makes
clear, I treat spaces as having, creating, and/or fostering place-specific feelings and meanings. My use of
“built space” is closer to the sense of place than it is to a possibly more diffuse notion of space; but I choose
that language over “place” because it allows me to emphasize the human creative dimension and to avoid
reifying the notion that a “placeless space” is possible (although I do not deny that built space elements may
be better or worse at creating that sense of place).
I might also seem to be equating hermeneutics with semiotics. In some ways, they are quite distinct.
Hermeneutic philosophy has a long-standing and much broader tradition of ferreting out the often largely
implicit rules developed and used by an interpretive community in analyzing texts—and, hence, by applica-
tion, to other artifacts, from paintings to acts. Semiotics ranges from a narrower focus on signs, structures,
and codes and their meanings (e.g., as outlined by de Saussure) to a broader analysis of semiotic systems as
social practices that situates them in their social and political context (more along the lines of Peirce’s work;
see, e.g., Gottdiener and Lagopoulos 1986; Hodge and Kress 1988). In some applications, however—and I
think built space is at times one of these—hermeneutics and social semiotics overlap significantly in their
concerns for language and other artifacts as mediating elements in self-expression and mutual understanding
and interpretation within a sociopolitical domain. It is in that sense that I use them here, in keeping also with
Barthes’s (1986) shift from “sign” to “symbol” as the central analytic device. For a similar orientation, albeit
with a vastly different focus, see Kerby (1997). - Churchill (1943) said these words in the context of an October 28, 1943, address on the subject of
rebuilding the House of Commons. The members were meeting in the House of Lords as their house had
been destroyed during the war. Churchill supported rebuilding it in its old form, despite the fact that the
space was inadequate for their numbers, arguing that on the occasion that a debate attracted members in
large numbers, the sight of them spilling out into the aisles would create a “sense of crowd and urgency.” - This position is shared by critical theorists and echoed in feminist “standpoint theory” (e.g., Hartsock
1987; Hawkesworth 1989; cf. Jacobson and Jacques 1990). It is in this sense that research writing, itself,
constitutes a way of “world making” (the phrase is Nelson Goodman’s, 1978; see Yanow 2000, chapter 6, on
this point). - P. Berger and Luckmann’s (1966, part II) discussion of intersubjectivity explains how this comes about.
- An interesting issue arises when the interpretations of situational members and those of the researcher
collide. I do not mean to imply that the researcher would always relinquish his interpretation in favor of
theirs. Instead, as discussed in chapter 4, I would argue that the interpretation presented has to be faithful
both to the lived experience of the situation and to the researcher’s analytic “experience.” Negotiating a
research report that is doubly faithful in this way is not always easy. See also chapter 5, this volume, on
establishing research trustworthiness. - There is yet another parallel in public policy studies, where interpretive policy analysis contests the
designation of those for whom policy programs are designed as policy “targets”—as if they were entirely
lacking in agency and completely passive in waiting for programs to “hit” them. - And there is also, at least conjecturally, an area of self known neither to the self nor to others.
- Ellen Pader (personal communication, August 17, 2004) suggests that front and back stages may
exist more on a continuum than as entirely discrete points. She also reminds me that some spaces are liminal
(see, e.g., Turner 1974). Analyses of border spaces (e.g., Anzaldúa 1987), one example of potentially liminal
space, suggest that they have their own character. - I say this based on the responses I have received in presenting built-space analysis to a variety of
academic audiences. For those attuned to the role of spaces and other physical artifacts, it can be quite
difficult to comprehend how unnatural this is for others. - Casey notes that “Husserl singles out the experience of walking as illuminating the mystery of how I