208 | CHAPTER 7
conventional language of scripture, and considered that the only way to do
this was by rational argumentation—which offered advantages in the other
two types of debate as well. One option was to use the mathematical or geo-
metrical proofs Kindī pioneered, as in the theological correspondence be-
tween the Christian Qustā ibn Lūqā and the Muslim polymath Ibn al-
Munajjim in the 860s.^41 Another possibility was to deploy Aristotelian logic,
which was widely enough taught not to be the exclusive prerogative of
philosophers.^42
An Andalusian theologian, Abū ʿUmar Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Saʿdī,
who visited Baghdad at the end of the tenth century, described this compro-
mise between reason and revelation after attending an assembly of scholars
which included
every kind of group: Sunni Muslims and heretics, and all kinds of infi-
dels: Mazdeans, materialists, atheists, Jews and Christians. Each group
had a leader who would speak on its doctrine and debate about it.
Whenever one of these leaders arrived, from whichever of the groups
he came, the assembly rose up for him, standing on their feet until he
would sit down, then they would take their seats after he was seated.
When the assembly [majlis] was jammed with its participants, and
they saw that no one else was expected, one of the infidels said: “you
have all agreed to the debate, so the Muslims should not argue against
us on the basis of their scripture, nor on the basis of the sayings of their
prophet, since we put no credence in these things, and we do not ac-
knowledge him. Let us dispute with one another only on the basis of
arguments from reason, and what observation and deduction will sup-
port.” Then they would all say: “Agreed.”... When I heard that, I did
not return to that majlis. Later someone told me there was to be an-
other majlis for discussion, so I went to it and I found them engaging
in the same practices as their colleagues. So I stopped going to the as-
semblies of the disputants, and I never went back.^43
Ibn Saʿdī’s observations are not isolated. He puts one in mind of Maʾm ū n’s
dream: he asked Aristotle “What is the good?” and was told whatever is ap-
proved by intellect, or religious law, or the opinion of the masses, in that or-
der.^44 The merits of reason/logic and grammar, in other words philosophy
versus the Qurʾanic sciences, were publicly debated. Defenders of logic, who
in Baghdad at this time were likely to be Christians such as Fārābī’s teacher
41 Gutas, in Arnzen and Thielmann (eds), Words, texts and concepts [5:124] 208–9.
42 S. Stroumsa, Freethinkers of medieval Islam (Leiden 1999) 172–88.
43 Abū ʿAbd Allāh al- Humaydī, On Andalusian savants (Jadhwat al- muqtabis) [ed. M. ibn T. al-
Tanjī (Cairo 1953)] 101–2 (tr. Griffith, Church in the shadow of the Mosque [5:119] 64).
44 Gutas, Greek thought [5:92] 96–104, and cf. n. 35.