represented in an autonomous act of faith that‘takes in’different
items.
Locke thinks that even among those who only acknowledge the
authority of Scripture, heresies emerge when people impose add-
itional requirements which they claim to have been deduced from
the Scriptures:
...when they have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only
foundation of faith, they nevertheless lay down certain propositions as
fundamental which are not in the Scripture, and because others will not
acknowledge (agnoscere) these additional opinions of theirs, nor build
upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental, they therefore
make a separation in the Church...for if they be conceived in the
express words of Scripture, there can be no question about them,
because those things are acknowledged by all Christians (omnium
consensu) to be of divine inspiration and therefore fundamental.^14Locke here wants to show that the Protestants should not add any-
thing to‘the express words of Scripture’; most doctrinal deductions
from the Holy Scripture are acknowledged by some and rejected by
others. For our study, Locke’s use of the concept of acknowledgement
is significant. As in Hobbes, the concept represents a personal con-
viction that can be approved or rejected. The continuity with the long
tradition ofagnitio veritatisis apparent in the very idea of personal
conviction. However, while this tradition emphasizes the heteronom-
ous relationship within which the conviction emerges, Locke under-
stands acknowledgement in terms of personal autonomy, since
persons and groups are free to decide whether they adopt this con-
viction or not.
In theLetter, acknowledgement sometimes has the more trad-
itional sense of apprehension. For instance, Locke can say that‘all
men know and acknowledge (sciunt et agnoscunt) that God ought to
be publicly worshipped’.^15 Idolatry means the act of acknowledging
(agnosco) another God.^16 On other occasions, acknowledgement is
a conditional decision, as in the following: ‘If we acknowledge
(agnoscis) that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew...how
can we maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a Chris-
tian?’^17 While such occasions reveal different shades of the concept,
(^14) Toleration, 150–2. (^15) Toleration, 100.
(^16) Toleration, 118. (^17) Toleration, 104.
The Modern Era 115