The consciousness of individuality presupposes that a person
appears so (anmutet) that others recognize this person as a rational
being. There is no self-consciousness without recognition by others.^66
A community of individuals bestows acts of recognition on all mem-
bers of this community, creating its members as free individuals. For
Fichte, the fact of treating others as rational beings entails recognition,
actual treatment of others being essentially recognition. There may
first only be an uncertainty of problematic recognition of myself by
the other. My reciprocity transforms this to an unconditional recogni-
tion:‘As surely as I recognize, that is, treat, the other, as surely he is
bound or committed through hisfirst problematic expression...to
recognize me categorically, and also generally, that is, to treat me as a
rational being.’This event creates a lasting connection between myself
and the other.^67 In this way, the freedom of an individual and mutuality
among persons coincide in the community-creating act of mutual
recognition. Such a legal relationship cannot be considered as fully
developed moral philosophy; however, when a person interprets the
recognition of others as one’s duty, one can speak of recognition as a
principle of legal thinking.^68
As Fichte makes no reference to religious sources or themes in his
discussion, it may not be plausible to point out connections between
his concept ofAnerkennungand the theological tradition. Generally
speaking, Fichte transforms the old legal concept ofagnoscoto suit
the modern needs of legal and political philosophy. We may note,
however, that Fichte’s Anerkennung differs from the English
‘acknowledgement’. While the English concept assumes personal
autonomy, Fichte considers that self-consciousness needs recognition
by others to emerge. In this sense, Fichte continues the long tradition
of relative heteronomy which is available in the religious discussions
regardingagnitioandrecognitio.
Philosophical research has shown how Fichte’s concept provides a
starting point for Hegel’s elaboration of the theory of recognition.^69
Less known, however, is the marked use of the concept of recognition
in the influential theological book by Johann Joachim Spalding,Reli-
gion, eine Angelegenheit des Menschen. This book, printed four times
between 1797 and 1806, understandsAnerkennung/recognition as the
basic concept that defines the correct understanding of religion. While
(^66) Grundlage, 353. (^67) Grundlage, 354. (^68) Siep 2014, 82–4.
(^69) See e.g. Honneth 1992, 29–30. New studies are discussed in Siep 2014, 12–20.
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