provide one answer. If humans need mutual recognition to become
individuals who can affirm the rule of law and live in a society,
recognition needs to be proposed as the legally constitutive event
through which humans can relate to God properly. Another possible
answer may be found in a criticism of orthodoxy that resembles Zin-
zendorf: Spalding claims here that religion does not start with theoretical
knowledge (notitia) which calls for assent and prompts trust (fides).
Instead, genuine religion starts with an act of trustful recognition; all
subsequent religious knowledge builds on this foundation.
Spalding’s discussion shows how these two answers are valid. His
evidential proof of religion isfirst directed to the two instincts:
As soon as the precise connection between the great foundational
instincts of his rational being and knowing and honouring God...is
objectively clarified to the thinking person, knowing and honouring
God must necessarily interest him and conquer his heart to induce
inward participatory esteem.^85In other words, Spalding holds that the instincts of well-being and
morality show the way to religion.
To elucidate this idea, Spalding describes a‘friend of virtue’who
‘recognizes’(anerkennet) and feels in his heart the full value of this
virtue. This person develops afirm conviction that eternal laws guide
our changing world and that there is a‘being’(Wesen) that directs all
this. Now, the conviction that such an‘origin’(Urheber) also equips
the human nature with a consciousness of right (Recht) and duty
brings about a kind of elevation of the soul. This elevation in turn
strengthens the feeling described.^86 The regulation of the natural law
then begins to appear as holy and as something that requires the
highest promulgator. Thus,finally, we are dealing with a real‘being’
who is our Lord and Benefactor with (mit) this thinkable, perfect
right (Recht).^87
This elucidation is no strict demonstration, but a chain of persua-
sion. Spalding focuses on the evidential power of virtue and justice,
claiming that their recognition brings about an added value, an
elevation, which leads towards divine being. While such a recognition
of virtue or right (Recht) is more modest than religious recognition,
Spalding’sdefinition of religion as recognition employs the idea of
(^85) Religion, 25. (^86) Religion, 26. (^87) Religion, 26.
The Modern Era 131