instance,‘afavour’. A special case is the event of self-recognition, in
which A recognizes himself or herself. I have also allowed cases of
acknowledgement or‘adequate regard’, in which some non-personal
B is recognized by A. However, it remains debatable whether
B becomes personified in such event. In this manner, new combin-
ations and conceptions of recognition are made possible through the
addition of specificcontent.
The concepts and conceptions defined in this manner as yet have
no religious content, being taken from a rather formal philosophical
discussion. The historical sources supply the religious content. When
this content is added to the formal elements, a richer theological
meaning emerges. Such fusions of form and content are referred to
in the following as‘paradigms’of religious recognition.
Let us now apply this cluster of conceptions to the historical
evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3. This evidence does not
start with simple conceptions that develop into more complex vari-
ants. The most ancient extensive treatment of religious recognition,
the LatinRecognitionsaround 400CE(see section 2.1), presents a
remarkably complex view, combining some aspects of Aristotelian
anagnorisiswith the New Testament ideas ofagnitio veritatisand
conversion. The process of recognition is mutual and brings about a
radical change in the recognizer that can be called a transformation of
the recognizer’s identity. In a reciprocal move, the recognizer in some
sense becomes the recognizee, as the True Prophet becomes the defin-
ing power of the recognizer’s new identity. In this way, the starting
point of our history of religious recognition offers a rich variety of
concepts and conceptions.
4.1.2. Upward/Downward/Equal
This does not mean, however, that‘all conceptions have always
existed’. Various aspects emerge in the intellectual history of religious
recognition. Let us begin the survey by focusing on the upward,
downward, and horizontal aspects. FromRecognitionsto the late
eighteenth century, the upward move towards the other is the stand-
ard mode of religious recognition. The downward move becomes more
significant in Schleiermacher (see section 3.3), who describes the divine
act of justification in terms of downward recognition. This big picture
of our history is remarkable since modern theories often assume that
186 Recognition and Religion