be argued to distinguish recognition from gift transfer, since gifts are
normally given to persons. On the other hand, phrases likebeneficium
recognosco(Bernard, section 2.3) convey the view that the primary
object of recognition is not the personal recipient but the impersonal
gift. We will return to the complex issue of gift transfer in section 4.3.
The modern distinction between acknowledging things and recog-
nizing persons cannot be simply projected onto historical texts, as
both vernacular verbs translate the Latinagnosco. At the same time,
we can observe that Hobbes and Locke already employ‘acknowledge’
so that it has a non-personal object (e.g. equality, Holy Scriptures,
opinions). The German verbanerkennenis more closely related to
personal objects. However, the German verb can also sometimes take
non-personal objects.
In religious contexts, the Latin phrases frequently personify the
non-personal object. In recognizing the truth, the recognizer attaches
herself to the divine person who represents this truth. This upward
recognition often assumes a downward favour in which the divine person
imparts the option of knowing the truth to the person performing the
upward recognition. In this manner, the phrases with non-personal
objects often assume a mutual, interpersonal act of recognition. Because
the claim that the act of religious recognition is almost always interper-
sonal and mutual is well founded, the paradigm of gift exchange cannot be
simply ruled out for lexical and grammatical reasons.
These observations remain valid through the entire history of
religious recognition. This history depicts an act that is basically
interpersonal and mutual (though not equal). Grammatically, such
an act sometimes looks unilateral. While it is important to note that
the object of recognition can be non-personal, these acts tend to
depict a) cases in which the gift object rather than the personal
recipient or giver is recognized, and b) cases that tend to personify
the impersonal recognizee. To tackle these complex cases, we need to
undertake some more linguistic analysis (section 4.3).
4.1.6. Recognizing OneselfThe historical survey has revealed an important theme that is
neglected in contemporary theories of recognition, namely, the
issue of recognizing oneself. While this is analogous to the classical
philosophical notion of‘knowing oneself’, it is also a distinct topic
192 Recognition and Religion