apply primarily to gift exchange. Rather, the act of the recognizer is
concerned with the protection or preservation that the agent receives
through the promise given as horizon of expectation. Thus the rec-
ognizer is not primarily giving a gift but affirming his or her own new
status within this protective mode. In this way, the promise that
constructs the horizon of expectation and the self-preserving act of
the recognizer together express the promise of self-preservation.
Remarkably, the status change and the change of mind pertain to
the recognizer rather than to the recognizee. Secondarily, the acts of
promise and the self-preserving approval of this promise may also
allude to the gifts given and received within the emerging protective
bond. As this mutuality need not be thought of in anthropological
terms, I often prefer to speak of the primary and constitutive recog-
nition as‘social interaction’rather than‘gift exchange’. We will return
to the issues of gift exchange in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.1.8. The Theological Content of Recognition
In our discussion on‘concepts and conceptions’(section 1.4), the
preliminary views were drafted in simple, formal, and non-religious
terms. Basically, the views were called social interaction (gift transfer)
conceptions which were differentiated using‘upward’,‘downward’,
and‘equal’qualifications. In addition to these, a strictly unilateral
adequate regard as well as some special cases (recognizing oneself,
mediated recognition, and identity change) were outlined. These
preliminary conceptions proved to be helpful in the historical survey,
as they allow me to highlight the specific views summarized above.
At this point, however, we can already see the specifictheo-
logical meanings of different historical views of religious recogni-
tion. While they employ many ofthe formal elements mentioned
above in terms of conceptions, they are qualitatively richer views
that employ the specific resources available in religious discourse.
We can now capture them properly by asking about the precise
content of religious recognition. After presenting the historical
material, we arefinally in a position to ask what the theological
meaning of religious recognition is. Obviously, each historical
author has a particular theological stance, but we can now also
ask whether we see any larger theological currents at work in
our history.
Recognition in Religion 195