distinctive identities through political processes, they are, because of
this, less segregated and have more mutual accountability.^18
Axel Honneth’sThe Struggle for Recognitionis largely concerned
with the interpretation of Hegel. He does not, however, focus primar-
ily on the famous Chapter 4 of thePhenomenology of the Spiritin
which Hegel introduces the idea of reciprocal recognition as well
as the parable of the lord and servant.^19 Honneth builds his argument
on the early writings of Hegel (cf. 3.3 below). He also employs
the insights of modern psychology, in particular those of Donald
Winnicott, arguing that psychological theories of interaction between
a parent and a child complement Hegel’s understanding of heteron-
omy. I will only describe the outcome of Honneth’s analyses, paying
some attention to many later works that specify and extend his theory
of recognition.
Honneth considers that the recognition of a person takes place in
three distinct ways. Thefirst occurs through care and love: a parent’s
care for an infant is a paradigmatic case for such mutual recognition,
but also romantic love and friendship belong to this mode. Love is
both genetically and conceptually prior to other modes of recogni-
tion; a person’s self-confidence, physical integrity, and emotional
stability are constructed in terms of loving recognition.^20
The second mode is that of respect. Society at large grants respect
to an individual, typically using law and rights as its instruments.
Through its cognitive and social dimension, respect constitutes
the person as responsible moral subject. The phenomenon of legal
recognition had already been discussed widely before Taylor and
Honneth (cf. 3.5). The sixth article of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, for instance, declares that‘everyone has the right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law’. For Honneth,
respect is reciprocal: I should regard other people as capable of acting
because of rational insight, and others should regard my acts in this
way. Respect is granted to everybody in the same way, not individu-
ally differentiated. Honneth often speaks of‘rights’or‘legal recogni-
tion’when he refers to the mode of respect.^21
(^18) For such political discussions, see Thompson 2006; Sardoc 2010.
(^19) Hegel,Phänomenologie, 147, 150. While the parable also articulates recognition,
it is not identical with the reciprocity discussed before its introduction.
(^20) Honneth 1992, 148–74, 211; Thompson 2006, 24–7.
(^21) Honneth 1992, 174–97; Thompson 2006, 48–50.
8 Recognition and Religion