In theological research, scholars have often observed the relational
character of late medieval and early modern religious thinking.^14 The
historical backgrounds (i) and (ii) argued in the present study are,
however, new claims that have not been proposed in previous
research. It may have been necessary to focus on the intellectual
history of religious recognition tofind this link between (i) and (ii)
on the one hand and the theology of justification and bridal mysti-
cism on the other. The existence of such a link gives rise to various
theological corollaries. For instance, it strengthens the claim of Jüngel
that the Reformation view of justification is connected with the idea
of recognition.^15 At the same time, some theologians might be uneasy
with our notion that the vocabulary of feudalism has something to
do with the emerging Protestant views regarding the justification of
the sinner.
In the present study, such corollaries cannotfind the space they
would deserve in other respects. For the Reformation studies special-
ists, the work of Oswald Bayer and Berndt Hamm may be important
in evaluating my claims. Bayer has devoted a lot of attention to the
relational theology of promise in the Reformation. Hamm has inves-
tigated the late medieval theology of promises and bonding. More
recently, Hamm has argued that the theology of‘pure gift’can be
employed as an overall explanatory view in interpreting the renewal
programmes of the Lutheran Reformation.^16 The findings of the
present study support the specialist views of Bayer and Hamm in
some important respects, though perhaps not in all.
The third paradigm of existential attachment continues some views
of the second, especially those regarding the importance of subjective
attachment and the new creation of the recognizer in the event of
religious recognition. The latter feature is, as we have seen, also
crucial in thefirst paradigm. There nevertheless seems to be a clear
difference between thefirst and second paradigms on the issue of
subjectivity. The third paradigm assumes a fairly stable view of the
recognizer. In Spalding and Schleiermacher, the parameters of reli-
gious recognition are given in the cognitive structure of the recog-
nizer. This subject can perform the act of practical recognition
(^14) See e.g. Ebeling 1964 and Oberman 1989.
(^15) Jüngel 2006, 7–8. Cf. section 1.1.
(^16) Bayer 1971 and 2008. Hamm 1977 and 2013.
212 Recognition and Religion