As Hoffmann wants to preserve the relationality of the‘gift of
recognition’rather than downplay it, our differences may not be
crucial. More generally, her view is concerned with the problem of
whether religious recognition fundamentally manifests the concep-
tion of‘gift exchange’. If yes, then the so-called as-qualification imme-
diately adds something to the already waiting recognizee so that a
claim of misrecognition can emerge. Such a view would resemble the
institution of patronage in which the social roles are already assumed,
and gifts add something to them. Relying on Griffin, I have argued
above that a proper distinction needs to be made between initial
constitutive recognition and subsequent institutionalized social
exchange. If recognition constitutes rather than assumes and preserves
such roles, this event does not resemble Hénaff’s exchange of cere-
monial gifts. I will return to this complex issue in section 4.3.
4.2.10. EcumenismOur historical account provides new insights into the ecumenical
elaboration of the concept of recognition. As shown in section 3.6,
the early ecumenical movement often adopts the legal and adminis-
trative use of this concept. Although later ecumenism strengthens the
theological profile of recognition, it nevertheless remains related to
the third paradigm of existential attachment. This connection is
particularly obvious in the assumption that the status change primar-
ily concerns the recognizee, whereas the recognizer retains its status
quo. While this assumption remains tacit in the sources, it clearly
permeates the ecumenical dialogue texts from the Toronto Declar-
ation to the Porvoo Common Statement. In these texts, recognition is
not formulated in terms of conversion or social bonding, but rather as
an act of a stable, autonomous subject.
In the Lutheran—Roman Catholic discussion about the Augsburg
Confession, the situation is somewhat different. Both Walter Kasper
and Joseph Ratzinger stress that an act of recognition must be a
spiritual act of decision-making. They approach the paradigm of
conversion in this manner (section 3.6). Heinrich Fries and Harding
Meyer are aware of the mutuality and differentiated identity required
in acts of recognition; in some ways, they move towards the second
paradigm. If we label thefirst and second paradigms as‘classical’
theological views and the third as‘modern’, we might say that the
Recognition in Religion 219