is legitimate. Fraser does not, however, renounce the idea of recog-
nition completely, seeking to construct it in a non-psychologist man-
ner. In her discussion with Honneth, she opts for a duality of
‘redistribution and recognition’, claiming that economic justice
needs to be understood as a balancing corrective in the struggle for
personal recognition.^31
Fraser also develops a discursive view of the social identity of
subjects, maintaining that social identitiesfluctuate and are cultur-
ally conditioned. Recognition is thus rather concerned with social
status than any underlying psychological identity.^32 In a just society,
people obtain‘a parity of participation’. This concept presupposes
both that objective resources are distributed fairly and that the
intersubjective conditions among subjects are not repressive. In
current societies, a parity of participation is often achieved through
deinstitutionalizing the existing hierarchies and granting privileges
to disadvantaged people.^33
While the works of Taylor and Honneth have prompted much
contemporary debate, they have some predecessors. In 1979, Ludwig
Siep demonstrated the prominence of recognition in the work of the
young Hegel. Siep’s new edition of this study elaborates his relation-
ship to the broader discussion on recognition.^34 By 1969, Stanley
Cavell had already paid attention to the peculiar features of‘acknow-
ledge’. Proceeding from ordinary language philosophy, Cavell shows
how one can use the verb‘know’in the sense of acknowledging, that
is, admitting and even confessing. For instance, when I acknowledge
your pain, you make a claim on me and my act expresses both
knowledge and a response to this claim.^35 What Cavell here and in
some of his later works^36 does by means of ordinary language analysis
comes very close to the uses of the Latin verbagnosco, which is
etymologically associated with acknowledgement and recognition
(cf. 2.1 and 3.1). Cavell’s use of literature and art highlights features
of interactive commitment that are also prominent in religious texts.
For the purposes of our study, two questions need to be asked with
regard to the earlier theorists: (i) Do they have an opinion concerning
the history of the idea of recognition? (ii) Do they treat religion as
part of their theory in any way? With regard to thefirst question, we
(^31) Fraser & Honneth 2003, 3. (^32) Thompson 2006, 27–31.
(^33) Thompson 2006, 78–81. (^34) Siep 2014.
(^35) Cavell 1969, 256, 263. (^36) E.g. Cavell 1979, 329–496.
Introduction 11