French and Latin as well) is discussed. Chapter 4 draws systematic
conclusions from the religious texts and formulates some new philo-
sophical ideas based on them. The obvious methodological problem
in this plan concerns the following: how do we decide which historical
concepts and ideas are treated under the umbrella of‘recognition’?To
make this determination, we apply a strategy Rainer Forst follows in
his history of toleration.^81
Forst starts his book with a discussion about the concept of toler-
ation in a general, philosophical manner. He defines some necessary
components of this concept, for instance those of disagreement and
partial approval. We can only tolerate something which we generally
disagree with but which we do not consider so harmful that we could
not approve it as existing in a society.^82 Forst follows John Rawls in
claiming that while‘the concept’refers to the basic semantic meaning,
‘conceptions’are specific and at the same time broader interpret-
ations of this meaning.^83 For instance, toleration can be interpreted as
permission, coexistence, mutual respect, or mutual esteem. Interpret-
ations can often be scaled to more and less demanding ones. For
instance, understanding toleration as permission is less demanding
than understanding it as mutual respect.
The distinction between concept and conceptions allows one to
construct two theoretical counterpoints between which the intellec-
tual history of an idea swings. On the one hand, the author need not
limit his or her discussion to the word or words that express the
concept. He may, for instance, discuss the conception of mutual
respect even in historical texts in which the word‘toleration’is not
used. On the other hand, the author cannot completely liberate
herself from the underlying concept and claim that all kinds of
conceptions may refer to it implicitly. The history of the word and
the corresponding concept should be kept in mind in some sense.
Obviously, a third counterpoint also remains valid, since if the word
does not express any conception relevant to the history to be written,
the occurrences of the word can be neglected. For instance, if the
Latin wordrecognitioonly means proofreading, it is not relevant for
the purposes of this book.
A history of some conception can be written even when the
concept is lacking. For instance, it is entirely adequate to investigate
(^81) Forst 2003. (^82) Forst 2003, 32–4.
(^83) Forst 2003, 30–1. Cf. Rawls 1971, 5.
Introduction 25