Whether the Greek terms genuinely allow for conceptual differenti-
ation is a matter to be discussed in the next chapter.
Thus, the lexical level is relatively clear in that in the quest for the
concept of recognition we are primarily concerned withagnosco/
recognoscoand their vernacular equivalents. Sometimes these words
need to be extended towards the generalcognosco. Let us next attempt
to identify the semantic components that constitute the concept
expressed by these words. We may carefully employ the recent studies
discussed in thefirst chapter, but we also need to make our own
choices. We should keep in mind that the components cannot estab-
lish a sufficient picture; they only give us the inevitable basic semantic
features. In addition to these, we need the interpretative‘conceptions’.
For the purposes of writing intellectual history, neither the concept
nor the conceptions should be defined too rigidly. Historical evidence
should remain capable of changing the initial parameters.
1 Thefirst conceptual feature is the cognitive component. In
recognition, somebody or something is perceived and known
in the sense that the recognizer can say who or what is con-
cerned. This basic cognitive component is close to‘identifica-
tion’. It must be remembered that the identification at stake here
is only very rudimentary and does not constitute anything like
fixed identity. In cognition, the knowing person connects
the object with other, previously known facts and concepts.
Although I am inclined to think that recognition usually
involves persons, the identification of the recognizee given
above as‘somebody or something’does not rule out the recog-
nition of facts and norms.
2 The second conceptual component is that of attachment. In
recognition, the recognizer not only perceives the recognizee
but also attaches a certain positive value or commitment to
him/her/it. Laitinen describes this component using words like
‘normativity’and‘value’, but they may be too post-Kantian for
our historical purposes. It is not easy tofind a concept that
remains flexible and avoids anachronism. ‘Approval’ and
‘acceptance’ are already too strong and interpretative, while
‘commitment’ has the same post-Kantian assumptions like
‘value’.‘Attachment’means involvement and creating a social
bond with the person or fact to be recognized; this bond need
not be moral or normative in the modern sense of the words.Introduction 27