co-existence of different groups, though it may prefer one or some of
them. The third conception is that of‘respect’, which assumes that the
tolerated parties honour one another. The fourth conception is that of
‘esteem’, assuming a developed form of reciprocal recognition.^88
These four conceptions are elegantly organized, as they proceed
from less developed and less demanding toleration towards more
developed and more demanding variants. One is also tempted to
organize the historical development of a topic so that it proceeds
towards more demanding variants. Here, however, special care is
needed. There is no a priori reason why the history of recognition
should proceed from less demanding to more demanding concep-
tions. It is probable that old historical societies had complex ways of
showing respect and recognition and that modern societies may be
more simple and straightforward in their conduct.
On the other hand, the systematic organization of different con-
ceptions into a continuum of less and more demanding variants
evidently adds to the explanatory power of such conceptions. I will
therefore employ this kind of organization, although I cannot achieve
the elegance provided by Forst. The construction of a systematic
continuum does not imply, however, a historical development from
less demanding to more demanding variants. Another matter rele-
vant for the present study concerns the relationship between toler-
ation and recognition. Forst assumes that the most developed
conceptions of respect and esteem come fairly close to the idea of
mutual recognition. As toleration is an enormous issue, it would be
premature to take any a priori stance on its relationship to the
concept and conceptions of recognition.
Most studies discussed in 1.2 above assume that recognition can be
of different kinds. In English studies, the semantic distinction
between (i) identification, (ii) acknowledgement of norms and facts,
and (iii) recognition of persons is fairly well established. Honneth’s
distinction between love, respect, and esteem can be regarded as
the most established philosophical taxonomy of recognition. While
Ricoeur and Hénaff plead for a‘gift exchange’conception of recog-
nition, Honneth represents a‘social interaction’view that does not
rely on anthropology.^89
(^88) Forst 2003, 42–8.
(^89) Bedorf 2010, 45 calls Honneth’s model an‘intersubjectivist’one.
30 Recognition and Religion