the cognitive content of recognition as the overall content of the
communication between A and B.’This statement claims that there
is one overall cognitive content of R to which both the recognizer and
the recognizee contribute. Rdef consists of all this relevant content,
answering to the‘as what’question of recognition. Strictly speaking,
the matters expressed by the symbols F, D, U, and E also belong to
Rdef. I have written them separately to highlight the distinctive
features of each conception.
Rdef is an ideal type that seeks to avoid the complex view claiming
that each of the recognitive parts (R0, R1, R2) has its own cognitive
content. In such a complex view, the parties frequently misunder-
stand each other’s intentions. I grant that the complex view is often
realistic and maintain only that its complexities can technically be
treated under the overall Rdef. For instance, we may have Rdef as
follows:‘Kosovofirst wanted everything, but the USA only granted
this. After a bargain, Kosovo received something more, but a dis-
agreement still persists concerning these matters.’In this manner, our
initial conceptions receive a fourth line as follows:
Rdef: A and B determine the cognitive content of R.We thus obtain four conceptions of recognition (strictly equal, down-
ward/equal, upward, strictly downward), all of which consist of four
parts or pieces (R0, R1, R2, Rdef). While the parts do not exist
independently of one another, they can be heuristically distinguished
and have particular features in each of three conceptions (e.g. R0 is
very different in the upward conception). The basic features of the
conceptrelate to theseconceptionsas follows: Rdef depicts the cogni-
tive content; R0, R1, and R2 depict the voluntary moves of attach-
ment between A and B. The voluntary moves assume and contain a
certain Rdef, though they can be heuristically distinguished from it.
My use of certain Rdef elements (F, D, U, E) as parts of the voluntary
moves (R0, R1, R2) also describe how A and B are available to one
another as the recognizer and the recognizee. In a sense, the four
conceptions express different combinations of cognition and attach-
ment between the recognizer and the recognizee.
Although my discussion makes use of analytical philosophy, the
theoretical conceptions outlined above have some surprising similar-
ities with the gift exchange conception of Ricoeur and Hénaff. This
is basically due to the linguistic fact that the verb‘give’and the noun
‘gift’assume a personal giver and personal recipient. If A and B are
38 Recognition and Religion