which is the recognition (recognitio) of some kind of excellence; and in
respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship
(cultus), consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands,
and by repaying him, according to one’s faculty, for the benefits (ben-
eficia) we received from him.^110On the one hand, this passage still reflects feudal law, being con-
cerned with the relationship between lord and servant, a bond estab-
lished through benefits and allegiance. On the other hand, the Latin
concept of recognition here means a normative acknowledgement.
The Augustinian idea of recollection has faded; the feudal idea of
honour remains. Given this, the basic meaning of such recognition
applies to the act of the servant.Recognitiothus remains an upward
act inSumma theologiae, although its context and some related
meanings in Thomas’s other writings, such as those in the expositions
of Matt. 25:42 and John 20:16, assume a mutual recognitive bond.
Interestingly, the passage quoted combines honour and recogni-
tion, terms that for Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth (cf. section 1.2)
remain either premodern (honour) or modern (recognition). Tho-
mas’s concept of dignity likewise connects premodern and modern
features since, as a realm governed by honour, this concept belongs to
the premodern, feudal era; however, the realm ofcultusconcerns an
operative relationship in which the esteem is measured through
mutually adequate services.
While we should not modernize Aquinas too much, we may
observe that in his response to objections in this context he makes a
distinction between two kinds of debts of honour. In the second kind,
the debt is not based on the status of a servant but on a kind of moral
esteem:
One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man
owes honour and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who
are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a
certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honour to
persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.^111It would be anachronistic to claim that these two modes correspond
to Honneth’s distinction between respect and esteem or Taylor’s
distinction between the politics of universalism and the politics of
(^110) SThII/2 q102 a2 resp.
(^111) SThII/2 q102 a2 ad2. Cf. section 4.5 in this volume.
The Latin Traditions 75