it can be reflected onto its own act. For, if the intellect is to understand
that it now performs the very act of understanding, it mustfirst
understand another thing. After the thing, it can recognize it is under-
standing (post eam se intelligere recognoscat).^144The same pertains to the will since its‘first object precedes its every
act. Thus, the will’s act cannot be thefirst thing the will wants.’^145
A‘recognition’is in this sense a second-order act of self-reflection
and retrospection. In the context ofPhilebus, this epistemic principle
supports the Thomist position that people are directed towards
happiness.^146
As a general rule of second-order understanding, however, Ficino’s
view of recognition has its own profile, as can be seen in other
occurrences of the verb. Ficino sometimes uses the verbrecognosco
in describing the Socratic view that a philosopher knows that he does
not really know anything; he recognizes his own ignorance.^147 This
can be classified as an instance of the general rule regarding
the second-order nature of recognitive understanding. Once inDe
amoreFicino speaks of the true, the good, the virtuous, and the useful.
These four things are represented in the soul as inner notions that the
soul desires. When the soulfinds them in the external world,‘recog-
nition’takes place with the help of the inner notions.^148 This passage
also manifests the heteronomy and second-order nature of recogni-
tive reflection. As in love, the way to the inner self proceeds through
the external medium.
A theologically significant use ofrecognoscois found inDe chris-
tiana religione. Ficino reports Plato’s view that only humans are
capable of divine participation, there being a form of knowledge by
which we recognize God (cognationem quandam Deum recognosci-
mus). This kind of knowledge assumes the object as the medium
through which something is known. As we can only see light through
light, we can only know God when our mind is full of God (animus
Deo plenus). Humankind cannot know anything higher than human-
ity unless this higher being makes himself known in this manner.^149
The use ofrecognoscoin this context thus assumes an act that turns
back to the mind of the subject andfinds God in this mind. While this
(^144) Philebus377 (Allen trans. slightly modified).
(^145) Philebus377. (^146) Philebus, Allen 1975, Introduction, 36–7.
(^147) De amoreVI, 10, Laurens, 173; Jayne, 129.Philebus279.
(^148) De amoreVI, 12, Laurens, 179; Jayne, 133. (^149) De chr. rel.2.
The Latin Traditions 85