The Price of Prestige

100 chapter four

Prosociality as Conspicuous Consumption

The conspicuous consumption model provides a simple answer to the pro-

sociality puzzle: actors engage in prosociality in an attempt to gain pres-

tige. The noninstrumental nature of prosociality makes it an attractive

costly signal — the actor is strong enough to practice self- help and yet has

sufficient resources to help others. In fact, viewing other- help as a costly

signal has become one of the most prominent explanations for prosocial-

ity among biologists, zoologists, and economists (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997 ;

Offer 1997 ; Van Vugt and Hardy 2010 ; McAndrew 2002 ; Zahavi 1975 ;

Grafen 1990 a, 1990 b; Maynard Smith 1991 ; Glazer and Konrad 1996 ). The

costly signals explanation gained popularity because it is the only analyti-

cal model that offers a self- enforcing mechanism for positive retribution

through the effect of prosociality on social stratification and prestige. Simi-

lar interpretations of prosociality and generosity have been widely applied

in anthropological analyses as well (Mauss 1990 ; Gurven et al. 2000 ; Clark

and Blake 1996 ; Malinowski 1932 ; Hage, Harary, and James 1986 ; Fiske

1990 ; Hyde 2007 ). The following discussion extends this growing literature

to international relations.

If indeed conspicuous consumption is at play in international proso-

ciality, we should observe a preference for conspicuousness, sensitivity to

hierarchy, and dynamic adoption of status symbols. We should see actors

more interested in being seen as providing assistance and less interested

in the actual effect of that assistance. We should expect symbolic policies,

tokenism, and a preference for grandiose projects. In the case of hierar-

chy, we should observe different patterns of prosociality based on actors’

locations in the international social stratification. Finally, we should expect

actors to adopt or reject prosocial policies based on their utility as credible

instruments for invidious comparison.

Other hints regarding the workings of conspicuous consumption are

likely to be found in the discourse surrounding international prosociality.

Even a superficial study of international aid provides a plethora of refer-

ences to prestige. Thus, when discussing aid allocation in Italy, proponents

of foreign aid argued that “a country obtained prestige and weight in the in-

ternational context in proportion to its activities in the Third World” (Van

der Veen 2002 , 20 – 21 ). Similarly, following its defeat in the Falklands War,

Argentina tried to regain prestige by becoming the biggest contributor of

peacekeepers in Latin America in hope of acquiring “ ‘first- world’ status”