110 chapter four
through fighting use a very costly process for signaling their status and
capabilities. The use of threats and ritualized forms of aggressive behavior
as a substitute for fighting could reduce these costs. The anthropology of
war provides many examples of limited and ritualized forms of fighting
aimed at reducing the cost of contestation while allowing for some dem-
onstration of capabilities and rank (Keegan 1993 ).
But threats are still pricey. For threats to be credible, they need to be
costly (Fearon 1994 a). Moreover, if signaling fails, a fight has to be fought.
A failed threat may harm an actor’s reputation not only vis- à- vis the ri-
val but also vis- à- vis other bystanders. Third parties may even use this re-
vealed weakness as an opportune time for an attack. This is especially true
in closely knit societies, in which all interactions are closely monitored by
all other members. Thus, the next evolutionary step is to further distance
the contestation from actual fighting. Zahavi and Zahavi ( 1997 , 142 ) sug-
gest that “actions that are not direct threats but are closely related to an
individual’s ability to win a struggle can take the place of threats.... The
altruist’s investment in the prosocial act offers a reliable, concrete index
of the individual’s ability.” As in the case of the evolution of signals, the
movement toward a contest of beneficence starts with the use of indexes
with robust intrinsic restrictions. In order to be a donor, an actor has to be
able to produce excess wealth. Therefore, prosociality is dependent on core
power indexes and thus can play an effective role as a test of status. Once a
contest of beneficence is institutionalized, it proves to be socially superior
to the more traditional forms of competition and thus improves the welfare
of the group that adopts it.^17
In the potlatch celebrations, the host used to end the ceremonial feast
by giving expensive gifts to members of other kin groups. This was often
accompanied by burning or destroying part of his own property in order
to demonstrate his superior wealth. This demonstration of consumption
and beneficence was deemed instrumental to the establishment of social
position. Codere ( 1950 ) points out that this practice arose concurrently
with a decline in violent warfare.^18 The institutionalization of this lavish
contest of beneficence and excess served as a substitute for war. Simi-
larly, Mauss notes that in many societies festivals and wars are closely
connected, and one can turn into the other very rapidly.
It is a competition to see who is the richest and also the most madly extrava-
gant. Everything is based upon the principles of antagonism and rivalry. The
political status of individuals in the brotherhood and clans, and ranks of all